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I. INTRODUCTION
Given a choice, many people would be inclined to pay an
undocumented debt to a local loan shark ahead of a secured
loan from their bank. After all, the consequences of failing to
pay the loan shark could make losing a house or car seem
mild by comparison. Once debtors enter bankruptcy,
however, they are no longer free to make this choice; the
Bankruptcy Code' recognizes only legal rights to payment
and establishes a firm system for allocating priorities among
claims. Practical extra-legal incentives and consequences do
not modify this reality-there is no "pay it or sleep with the
fishes" exception to the bankruptcy priority scheme.
Even this most fundamental bankruptcy principle has
been corrupted in the equitable netherworld of asbestos
defendant Chapter 11 reorganizations. Legislative and
judicial efforts to make asbestos-driven bankruptcies more
efficient, maximize assets available to compensate current
and future asbestos victims, and preserve viable businesses
have, over time, provided a small group of law firms2 a de
facto veto power over any asbestos bankruptcy plan. Given
the common presumption that this veto power is absolute,
most asbestos defendant-debtors and bankruptcy courts have
been extremely deferential to the Controlling Firms'
demands; even to the point of approving schemes that violate
black-letter bankruptcy law and raise significant
professional responsibility concerns.
The result is an unusual paradox-the only way for
debtors to obtain the asbestos plaintiff votes required to have
a reorganization plan confirmed is to accept terms that will
1 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006) [hereinafter the "Bankruptcy Code" or
"Code"].
' These law firms are hereinafter referred to as the "Controlling
Firms."
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render the plan unconfirmable or, at least, unable to
withstand a sustained challenge on appeal. Even if asbestos
defendant-debtors ultimately overcome the paradox, they
may be discouraged from pursuing a timely bankruptcy filing
or choose increasingly risky alternatives outside of
bankruptcy, thereby depleting their assets and reducing
their ability to reorganize when they ultimately file Chapter
11. Under any scenario, whatever assets remain for future
victims will be insufficient to compensate them for their
injuries.
This Article begins with an overview of the interwoven
histories of asbestos tort and bankruptcy law. Against this
backdrop, the second section questions the basic policy and
administrative assumptions that produced the asbestos
bankruptcy paradox. Finally, I suggest several basic, yet
critical, judicial responses that will help restore the integrity
of asbestos bankruptcy administration, preserve due process
for future victims and advance bankruptcy law's key goals of
efficiency, fairness and finality.
II. ASBESTOS TORT AND BANKRUPTCY: THE
DOWNWARD SPIRAL
A. A Brief History of Asbestos Tort and Bankruptcy
The history of asbestos in America is a history of failure-
failure of asbestos producers to protect their employees and
the public, of physicians and researchers to sound the alarm
and of federal and state governments to acknowledge and
address asbestos-related illness. For more than half a
century, senior asbestos industry executives carefully
orchestrated a systematic campaign to conceal the dangers of
asbestos exposure. The success of this campaign over such
' See, e.g., Michael Bowker, FATAL DECEPTION: THE UNTOLD STORY OF
ASBESTOS 87-108 (2003) (discussing the asbestos industry's history of
concealing the dangers of asbestos exposure); Andrew Schneider & David
McCumber, AN AIR THAT KILLS 179-84 (2004) (outlining W.R. Grace's
efforts to conceal asbestos exposure issues); Jock McCulloch, Saving the
Asbestos Industry, 1960 to 2006, 121 PUB. HEALTH REP. 609, 610 (2006);
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an extended period is due not only to the long latency period
between exposure to asbestos fiber and the appearance of
symptoms, but also to the acquiescence of medical
professionals, regulators and politicians.4 These failures
allowed producers to delay the introduction of asbestos
safety programs and ensure that the financial burdens
associated with asbestos disease remained squarely on the
shoulders of the victims.
This history of failure did not end once the dangers of
asbestos became widely known, as early asbestos cases failed
to provide meaningful recovery to victims due to scorched
earth defense tactics' and victim compensation systems that
were ill-suited to the unique nature of asbestos illness.
Even after the previously unfathomable scope of the asbestos
industry's deception was uncovered, the inherent difficulties
created by the long latency period of asbestos disease-
including the evidentiary barriers to proving exposures that
occurred decades earlier-continued to undermine asbestos
personal injury cases.7
Geoffrey Tweedale, Asbestos and its Lethal Legacy, 2 NATURE REVS.,
CANCER 311, 312-13 (2002); Michelle J. White, Asbestos and the Future of
Mass Torts, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 183, 185 (2004).
4 See, e.g., Roberta C. Barbalace, A Brief History of Asbestos Use and
Associated Health Risks, ENVIRONMENTALCHEMISTRY.COM, Oct. 2004,
http://environmentalchemistry.com/yogi/environmental/asbestoshistory200
4.html; Bowker, supra note 3, at 145-59 (discussing the history of
regulatory failures).
' See Bowker, supra note 3, at 131-44, 161-85 (discussing litigation
and settlement tactics of W.R. Grace); Anthony Z. Roisman et al.,
Preserving Justice: Defending Toxic Tort Litigation, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.
REV. 191, 213 (2004) ("The history of asbestos litigation is a lesson in the
costs of intransigence. In the early days of asbestos litigation, like the
early days of tobacco litigation, defendants successfully resisted claims.
Even after it became obvious to the world that both asbestos and tobacco
claims had merit, defendants continued to resist the claims. That
intransigence is the principal cause of the high transaction costs and not
the toxic tort litigation system.").
6 Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United States:
Triumph and Failure of the Civil Justice Stystem, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255,
259-60 (2005-2006).
7 Id. at 260.
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Eventually, the pendulum started to swing in favor of
plaintiffs and, when it did, defendants were faced with
crushing asbestos liabilities.' Although state and federal
governments were disinclined to regulate the asbestos
industry,9 state courts and legislatures played an active role
in modifying the tort system to make it more "plaintiff-
friendly."1 ° At the same time, the emerging evidence of the
asbestos industry's scheme to mislead the public and its
aggressive litigation practices made courts and juries far
more receptive to plaintiffs' requests for large compensatory
and punitive awards.1  After decades of deception,
obfuscation and indifference to the personal costs the
industry inflicted on the public, the industry's days were
numbered.
B. Asbestos Defendant Bankruptcies
When Johns-Manville petitioned for bankruptcy
protection in 1982, stunned lawyers and victims' rights
advocates were up in arms. As the largest bankruptcy in
history at the time, Manville's Chapter 11 was an easy
target. Critics railed against the filing as an abuse of the
bankruptcy process12 and an unconscionable tactic to delay
payment to the sick and dying.13 On the surface, these
' Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals From Private Attorneys General
in Mega Social Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 511, 540 (2001)
(discussing Professor Francis McGovern's experience with the volume of
asbestos cases clogging courts in the early 1990s).
Hensler, supra note 6, at 278.
10 Deborah Hensler et. al., RAND Inst. for Civ. Just., ASBESTOS
LITIGATION IN THE U.S.: A NEW LOOKAT AN OLD ISSUE 28 (2001), available
at http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented-briefings/DB362.0/DB362.0.pdf.
1' White, supra note 3, at 194.
12 Elmer W. Lammi, Asbestos Victims Denounce Firm's Bankruptcy
Tactic, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 11, 1983, at A8; Larry Reibstein, Manville's
Move Turns Hopes to Dust in Asbestos Lawsuits, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 27,
1982, at C12 (noting plaintiffs' counsel's characterization of the Manville
bankruptcy filing as "a ploy to delay the suits while buying time for
congressional action on a compensation fund for asbestos victims").
13 Warren Brown, Surviving 'Creative' Bankruptcy; As A Business
Strategy, Firms Find that it Exacts a Heavy Price, WASH. POST, Nov. 6,
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criticisms reflected a basic, common-sense concern: how
could a seemingly healthy company with assets in excess of
$2 billion and fixed liabilities of roughly $1 billion possibly
be a candidate for bankruptcy?
Unlike its predecessor, however, the new bankruptcy law
did not require imminent or actual insolvency for a debtor to
be eligible for relief. This was no mere oversight; the
insolvency requirement was omitted to serve the goals of
"preserving going concerns and maximizing property
available to satisfy creditors"14 by ensuring timely access to
the bankruptcy process. 5 And as the principal asbestos
personal injury litigation defendant, Manville faced
potentially limitless liability-a fact that its auditors
emphasized in issuing qualified opinions of the company's
operating reports for two years prior to its bankruptcy. 6
1988, at H1 ("Manville's filing shocked the nation and sparked an
explosion of charges that the company was trying to avoid its legal and
moral responsibilities through a reworded bankruptcy statute."); Mark
Clayton, Manville Pulling Out of the Asbestos Quagmire, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 3, 1988, at 12 ("Immediately after Manville filed, lawyers
for those harmed by asbestos charged a 'perversion' of the bankruptcy laws
and castigated the company for ducking its responsibility."); Judge
Criticizes Johns-Manville, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14, 1986, at 71 (quoting
U.S. District Judge H. Lee Sarokin, "History will record that the Johns-
Manville Corp. manipulated the judicial system so as to delay to
thousands of claimants and possibly deny completely to some their day in
court to present asbestos-related injuries...").
14 Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. Lasalle St. P'ship,
526 U.S. 434, 453 (1999).
" As explained in the Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States: "The process should encourage resort to it, by
debtors and creditors, that cuts short the dissipation of assets and the
accumulation of debts. Belated commencement of a case may kill an
opportunity for reorganization or arrangement." REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRuPTcy LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 93-137, pt. 2, at 75 (1973); H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 220 (1977); see also
In re SGL Carbon Corp., 200 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 1999) ("It also is clear
that the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code understood the need for early
access to bankruptcy relief to allow a debtor to rehabilitate its business
before it is faced with a hopeless situation.").
16 Tamar Lewin, Asbestos Now Company Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
1982, at D2; see also Brown, supra note 13, at H1 (quoting former Manville
Thus, in denying a motion to dismiss Manville's Chapter 11
case, Bankruptcy Judge Lifland reasoned:
[T]he drafters of the Code envisioned that a
financially beleaguered debtor with real debt and
real creditors should not be required to wait until the
economic situation is beyond repair in order to file a
reorganization petition. The "Congressional purpose"
in enacting the Code was to encourage resort to the
bankruptcy process. This philosophy not only
comports with the elimination of an insolvency
requirement, but also is a corollary of the key aim of
Chapter 11 of the Code, that of avoidance of
liquidation ....
In the instant case, not only would liquidation be
wasteful and inefficient in destroying the utility of
valuable assets of the companies as well as jobs, but,
more importantly, liquidation would preclude just
compensation of some present asbestos victims and
all future asbestos claimants. This unassailable
reality represents all the more reason for this Court
to adhere to this basic potential liquidation
avoidance aim of Chapter 11 and deny the motions to
dismiss. Manville must not be required to wait until
its economic picture has deteriorated beyond
salvation to file for reorganization.17
Of course, like other Chapter 11 debtors, early asbestos
bankruptcy debtors were concerned less with remaining
under bankruptcy protection than their ability to emerge
from bankruptcy as financially healthy companies.
However, the long latency period for asbestos disease that
facilitated decades of concealing the dangers of asbestos now
worked against these asbestos defendant-debtors; they could
resolve known claims in bankruptcy, but a potentially
overwhelming number of new claims could arise well into the
C.E.O W. Thomas Stephens as saying "[tihere were not a hell of a lot of
choices available when the board made that decision [to file bankruptcy] in
1982.").
", In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 736 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(denying motion to dismiss Manville's Chapter 11 petition) (citations
omitted).
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future. This fact complicated the early asbestos debtors'
efforts to reorganize as both a practical and legal matter-
Chapter 11 debtors can reorganize only if they establish that
they will not be forced back into bankruptcy,"8 and most
asbestos plans that fail to resolve future asbestos liabilities
could not satisfy this requirement.
Even if the Bankruptcy Code authorized courts to enjoin
future claimants from suing the reorganized companies, due
process ordinarily requires giving parties an opportunity to
contest the modification of their rights,19 and it is not
possible to provide this opportunity to those who may not
become aware of their injury until months or years after plan
confirmation. ° And as much as bankruptcy may vary from
18 Bankruptcy Code § 1129(a)(11) (A reorganization plan may only be
confirmed if it "is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need
for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the
debtor under the plan. . . ."); see also In re UNR Industries, Inc., 725 F.2d
1111, 1119 (7th Cir. 1984) ("If future claims cannot be discharged before
they ripen, UNR may not be able to emerge from bankruptcy with
reasonable prospects for continued existence as a going concern."); In re
Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 757 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting the
need to address future claims in order for reorganization to occur).
" See Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 2175 (2008) ("[Olur decisions
emphasize the fundamental nature of the general rule that a litigant is not
bound by a judgment to which she was not a party. Accordingly, we have
endeavored to delineate discrete exceptions that apply in 'limited
circumstances."') (citations omitted); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 120-
21 (1991) (noting "the importance that we attach to the concept of fair
notice as the bedrock of any constitutionally fair procedure."); Hansberry
v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) ("It is a principle of general application in
Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in
personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to
which he has not been made a party by service of process."); Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("The fundamental requisite of due
process of law is the opportunity to be heard."); Vale Chem. Co. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 516 A.2d 684, 688 (Pa. 1986) ("Essential to the
adversary system of justice, and one of the basic requirements of due
process, is the requirement that all interested parties have an opportunity
to be heard.").
21 In re Waterman Steamship Corp., 141 B.R. 552, 559 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("No future Asbestosis Claimant who, by definition, had
yet to manifest any detectible injury prior to confirmation, could be
deemed to have relinquished substantive rights when, even if that
ordinary litigation, the mere happenstance that proceedings
occur in a bankruptcy forum does not eliminate the
obligation to satisfy the dictates of due process.2 On the
individual had read the 'notice,' those individuals would have remained
completely unaware that their substantive rights were affected."), vacated,
157 B.R. 220 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993), remanded to 200 B.R. 770 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1996).
21 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989) (Bankruptcy
proceedings may terminate preexisting rights of absent parties only "if the
scheme is otherwise consistent with due process.") (emphasis added); N.
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 117 (1982)
("Bankruptcy proceedings remain ... subject to all of the strictures of [the
Due Process Clause].") (White, J., dissenting); Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935) ("The bankruptcy power, like
the other great substantive powers of Congress, is subject to the Fifth
Amendment."); In re Hanson, 397 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting
that the unique nature of bankruptcy does not remove the need to satisfy
due process); Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Repp (In re Repp), 307 B.R. 144,
149 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that student loan discharge in
Chapter 13 plan failed to provide sufficient notice to satisfy due process);
In re Ruehle, 296 B.R. 146, 164-5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003) (discussing due
process in a student loan discharge bankruptcy dispute and concluding
"Due process is not to be sliced, diced and disguised with sauce. Due
process must be served whole, without garnish"); In re Kewanee Boiler
Corp., 198 B.R. 519, 536-37, (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) ("The Bankruptcy
Code encourages businesses to reorganize through rewriting debt.
However, the Code cannot justify disregarding due process concerns and
bankruptcy notice requirements to the detriment of persons affected and
benefit businesses seeking to eliminate liability and their known creditors
who receive notice."); Laura B. Bartell, Due Process for the Unknown
Future Claim in Bankruptcy-Is This Notice Really Necessary?, 78 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 339, 347-48 (2004) ("The Constitution has thus given us two
fundamental policies: one policy requiring that property not be taken
without due process of law, and another policy allowing Congress to
provide for uniform bankruptcy legislation. If possible, we must interpret
the laws that Congress has enacted under its constitutional authority in a
way that meets the requirements of the Due Process Clause."). As the
First Circuit explained, the distinction drawn between ordinary cases and
bankruptcy proceedings is a narrow one:
There are specialized proceedings, such as bankruptcy,
reorganization, or probate proceedings, where a party may
be barred from future litigation by his mere failure to
intervene. Cases in that category would seem limited,
however, to ones where by statute, rule or practice,
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other hand, the inability to address future asbestos liability
could force an otherwise viable company into liquidation and
thereby undermine future victims' prospects for recovery.22
The preservation of customary due process would come at
the cost of the very property rights due process is intended to
protect. Thus, binding future claimants in spite of their
absence would be to their benefit, as it presumably would be
to other constituencies.
Against this backdrop, the so-called "futures problem"
was less one of determining whether modified due process
was appropriate than one of determining the form that it
should take. The recognition that liquidation could doom
recovery prospects for future claimants did not, of course,
strip these claimants of the right to a fair, equitable process
to guard against encroachment upon their individual
interests any more than it did other parties whose recoveries
could be threatened by liquidation. Any substitute process,
then, needed to ensure that current creditors would not
gorge themselves at the expense of future claimants.
In Manville, the focal point of this modified framework
was the appointment of a legal representative for future
victims, who played the role of the "honest broker"24 among
the conflicting current interests and ensured that any
negotiated resolution was not purchased at the expense of
future victims. With substantial contributions from the legal
representative, Manville and its creditors ultimately adopted
what has become known as the "trust-injunction" approach.
Put simply, asbestos plaintiffs were enjoined from initiating
intervention, after notice, is invited, or at least where the
affected parties have reason to understand that their
rights will be foreclosed unless timely asserted in the
original proceeding.
Griffin v. Bums, 570 F.2d 1065, 1071 n.7 (1st Cir. 1978).
2 Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in
Mass Tort Bankruptcies, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1435, 1436 (2004).
23 See Alan Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise:
Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045, 2066-67 (2000).
24 Frederick Tung, The Future Claims Representative in Mass Tort
Bankruptcy: A Preliminary Inquiry, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 43, 72 (2000).
litigation against Manville and certain others, the plaintiffs'
claims were channeled to a trust funded by these parties and
the trust became responsible for processing and satisfying
these claims.25
In spite of the considerable financial contributions to the
early trusts, it soon became apparent that new asbestos
plaintiffs would receive, at best, pennies on the dollar for
their claims.2 6  The dramatic expansion of asbestos tort
litigation drove defendants into bankruptcy. These
bankruptcies left the remaining defendants with
considerably greater liability27 and sent lawyers searching
for new defendants.2" This cycle continues to this day.29
25 Mark D. Plevin, Leslie A. Epley & Clifton S. Elgarten, The Future
Claims Representative in Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: Conflicts of
Interest, Strange Alliances, and Unfamiliar Duties for Burdened
Bankruptcy Courts, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 271, 277 (2006)
(summarizing the Johns-Manville approach).
2 See Stephen Labathon, The Bitter Fight Over the Manville Trust,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 8, 1990, at F1 (noting how the Manville Trust was
effectively "looted" within two years after its inception); see also Richard A.
Nagareda, MAss TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 75 (2007) ("The
Manville trust proved to be a perilous institution ... with large numbers
of claims quickly overwhelming its initial capitalization.").
27 Anup Malani & Charles Mullin, The Effect of Joint and Several
Liability on the Bankruptcy Rate of Defendants: Evidence from Asbestos
Litigation 14 (Working paper, May 27, 2004), available at http:ll
ssrn.com/abstract=552081 ("[If no companies had gone bankrupt between
1990 and 2002, the asbestos liabilities of solvent, major asbestos
defendants might have been as small as two-fifths their present size.");
Nagareda, supra note 26, at 167 (noting the domino effect of the Manville
bankruptcy).
28 See Patrick Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM L. 525, 547 (2007) (noting that the dramatic rise in
asbestos claim filings during the 1990s "led to an unprecedented wave of
asbestos bankruptcies" and resulted in a broader search for defendants);
White, supra note 3, at 196-97.
' Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos
Litigation: The Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L.
REv. 33, 55 (2003) ("[Manville's bankruptcy] posed a severe problem for
plaintiff attorneys, setting off a concerted effort to find other deep pockets
to supplant and supplement Manville, a process which inures to this day
as seventy companies have joined Manville in entering bankruptcy."); see
also Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Rochelle M. Tedesco,
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C. The New Asbestos Bankruptcy Landscape
The legal foundations for the trust-injunction mechanism
in Manville and other early cases-the court's equitable
authority and largely unsettled interpretations of key
provisions of the Code-were, at best, unstable. Although
courts sitting in bankruptcy may "issue any order, process,
or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]"30  and enjoy
considerable equitable authority to address the situations
that come before them, this power is very limited and may
not be used to circumvent or rewrite the express
requirements of the Code. 1  The resulting uncertainty
Addressing the "Elephantine Mass" of Asbestos Cases: Consolidation
Versus Inactive Dockets (Pleural Registries) and Case Management Plans
that Defer Claims Filed by the Non-Sick, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 271, 280 (2003).
As one author summarized:
Once again, evidence that a serious problem of "too many
defendants" exists is reflected in what presumably
sympathetic critics say about the situation. Thus, Senior
U.S. District Court Judge Weinstein has observed: "If the
acceleration and expansion of asbestos lawsuits continues
unaddressed, it is not impossible [to foresee] that every
company with even a remote connection to asbestos may be
driven to bankruptcy." And prominent plaintiffs' lawyer
Richard Scruggs observes that asbestos litigation has
become an "endless search for a solvent bystander."
James A. Henderson, Jr., Asbestos Litigation Madness: Have the States
Turned a Corner?, 20-23 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP. ASBESTOS 19 (2006)
(modification in original). Indeed, it appears that searching out new
asbestos defendants has become a cottage industry in itself. See, e.g.,
Asbestos Litigation: Fire in the Courts; Bankruptcies Explode as the
Asbestos Inferno Rages On, TRIAL LAWYERS INC., 2007, http://www.trial
lawyersinc.com/htmllpart05.html (private company's report on the general
state of asbestos litigation, supporting and bolstering the search by
asbestos plaintiff lawyers for new defendants, including any company that
has ever used asbestos in its products).
" Bankruptcy Code, § 105(a).
"Raleigh v. Ill. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 24-25 (2000)
("Bankruptcy courts are not authorized in the name of equity to make
wholesale substitution of underlying law controlling the validity of
creditors' entitlements, but are limited to what the Bankruptcy Code itself
weighed on the stock of the reorganized companies to the
detriment of the trusts established to pay asbestos claims32
and discouraged companies from adopting similar
approaches until after their litigation costs depleted
significant assets that would have otherwise been available
for victims.
To address these concerns, Congress amended the
Bankruptcy Code in 1994 to include Section 524(g), which
largely codified the approach utilized in Manville,33 and
provides."); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206
(1988) ("[Wlhatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts
must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy
Code."); United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1996) (holding
that bankruptcy courts are not authorized to modify the bankruptcy
priority scheme); In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 236 (3d Cir.
2004) ("The general grant of equitable power contained in § 105(a) cannot
trump specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and must be exercised
within the parameters of the Code itself."); United States v. Sutton, 786
F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) ("While the bankruptcy courts have
fashioned relief under Section 105(a) in a variety of situations, the powers
granted by that statute may be exercised only in a manner consistent with
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. That statute does not authorize
the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise
unavailable Under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do
equity."); see also Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. McDow (In re Garriock),
373 B.R. 814, 817 (E.D. Va. 2007) ("Even if the Court believed that
Congress struck the wrong balance in this case, and did not adequately
consider the potential creation of windfalls for solvent debtors, the Court is
not at liberty to substitute its policy judgment for that of Congress.").
32 140 CONG. REC. S4521, S4523 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 1994) (statement of
Sen. Brown) ("Without a clear statement in the code of a court's authority
to issue such injunctions, the financial markets tend to discount the
securities of the reorganized debtor."); see also Elihu Inselbuch, Some Key
Issues in Asbestos Bankruptcies, 44 S. TEX. L. REv. 1037, 1040 (2003) ("The
enactment of Section 524(g) removed the uncertainty surrounding Johns-
Manville and made it possible to transmute the equity value of that
company into money so that claimants could be paid.").
33 140 CONG. REC. H10752, H10765 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) ("The
procedure is modeled on the trust/injunction in the Johns-Manville case,
which pioneered the approach a decade ago in response to the flood of
asbestos lawsuits, it was facing."); Andrew W. Caine & Thomsen Young,
Need Post-Confirmation Injunctive Relief? Get Some Class, 14 AM. BANKR.
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Section 524(h), which retroactively authorized the trust-
injunction mechanisms used in plans confirmed prior to the
amendments. 4 As Senator Heflin explained:
Mr. President, this statutory affirmation of the
court's existing injunctive authority is designed to
help asbestos victims receive maximum value. It
does so by assuring investors, lenders, and employees
that the reorganized debtor has indeed emerged from
Chapter 11 free and clear of all asbestos-related
liabilities other than those defined in the confirmed
plan of reorganization, and that all asbestos-related
claims and demands must be made against the court-
approved trust. This added certainty will ensure
that the full value of such a trust's assets-the
securities upon which it relies in order to generate
resources to pay asbestos claims-can be realized. 5
1. The Structure of Section 524(g)
Section 524(g) authorizes an asbestos bankruptcy
reorganization plan "to enjoin entities from taking legal
action for the purpose of directly or indirectly collecting,
recovering, or receiving payment or recovery with respect to
any claim or demand that, under a plan of reorganization, is
to be paid in whole or in part by [an asbestos trust
established in accordance with Section 524(g)]" under
INST. J. 30, 31 (Nov. 1995) (Section 524(g) codified the Manville trust-
injunction approach).
14 Bankruptcy Code, § 524(h).
35 140 CONG. REC. S14461, S14464 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1994). Senator
Brown also described Section 524(g)'s role in a similar fashion:
Without a clear statement in the code of a court's authority
to issue such injunctions, the financial markets tend to
discount the securities of the reorganized debtor. This in
turn diminishes the trust's assets and its resources to pay
victims. The amendment is intended to eliminate that
speculation so that the marketplace values the trust's
assets fairly.
140 CONG. REC. S4521, S4523 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 1994).
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specified conditions. 6 Among other things, these conditions
include the appointment of a "legal representative for the
purpose of protecting the rights of persons that might
subsequently assert [asbestos-related] demands"37 and the
establishment of a trust that treats similar current and
future claims in "substantially the same manner."38  In
addition, at least 75% of any class or classes of current
asbestos claimants must vote in favor of the plan. 9
Although Section 524(g) establishes a supplemental
mechanism for the reorganization of asbestos defendants, it
does not supplant the Code's other requirements. As the
Third Circuit explained:
Section 524(g) provides a special form of
supplemental injunctive relief for an insolvent debtor
facing the unique problems and complexities
associated with asbestos liability. Channeling
asbestos-related claims to a personal injury trust
relieves the debtor of the uncertainty of future
asbestos liabilities. This helps achieve the purpose of
Chapter 11 by facilitating the reorganization and
rehabilitation of the debtor as an economically viable
entity .... To achieve this relief, a debtor must
satisfy the prerequisites set forth in § 524(g) in
addition to the standard plan confirmation
requirements.4 °
2. The Right to Vote and the Power to Veto
Like any other class of creditors, asbestos tort creditors
are entitled to vote for or against any plan of reorganization
that impairs their claims.41 Understanding how asbestos
36 Bankruptcy Code, § 524(g)(1)(B).
31 Id. at § 524(g)(4)(B)(i).
38 Id. at § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V).
39 Id. at § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb).
40 In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 234 (3d Cir. 2004)
(emphasis added).
41 Bankruptcy Code Section 1124(1) provides that most claims will be
considered impaired unless the plan "leaves unaltered the legal, equitable,
and contractual rights to which such claim or interest entitles the holder
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creditor voting rights have given rise to a unique veto power
requires an appreciation of how these rights differ from
ordinary voting rights and the manner in which asbestos
claimants' votes are cast in Chapter 11.
a. Voting Rights Generally
Section 1129 outlines the necessary conditions that any
plan of reorganization must satisfy in order to be confirmed.
Among these, the Bankruptcy Code requires certain
minimum evidence of creditor support, which is gauged by
soliciting and processing creditor votes for or against the
plan." As the Third Circuit explained, "By providing
impaired creditors the right to vote on confirmation, the
Bankruptcy Code ensures the terms of the reorganization
are monitored by those who have a financial stake in its
outcome. '' 3
In most instances, individual creditors or creditor groups
will find it difficult to transform their voting rights into a
veto power. First, Section 1129(a)(8) requires only the
acceptance of each impaired class, not of each impaired
creditor. Under Section 1126(c), an impaired class is deemed
to accept a plan if it is approved by eligible creditors "that
hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in
number of the allowed claims of such class held by
creditors ... that have accepted or rejected such plan." In a
class with several distinct, perhaps conflicting interests,
forging a cohesive unified voting block can be the bankruptcy
equivalent of herding cats. Moreover, skillful plan
proponents may be able to shatter this voting block after it is
of such claim or interest. . . ." Thus, even changes that arguably improve
a creditor's rights may constitute impairment under the Code. In re L & J
Anaheim Assocs., 995 F.2d 940, 942-43 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Rhead, 179
B.R. 169, 177 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1995) ("[A]ny change of a creditor's rights,
whether for the better or for the worse, constitutes impairment. .. ").
42 In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202, 218 & n.35 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993)
("Section 1129(a)(10) was intended not to give [an individual] lobby a veto
power, but merely to require 'some indicia of creditor support' for
confirmation of a proposed Chapter 11 plan.").
' In re Combustion Engg, Inc., 391 F.3d at 244.
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forged by making modest concessions to discrete creditors or
groups within the class.
Even if these obstacles are somehow overcome, plan
proponents will often be able to structure the plan to allow
them to "cram down" the plan under Section 1129(b). Under
this provision, a plan may be confirmed over its rejection by
an impaired class "if the plan does not discriminate unfairly,
and is fair and equitable, with respect to each class of claims
or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the
plan." This power is only available, however, if "at least one
class of claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted
the plan, determined without including any acceptance of the
plan by any insider.""
The emphasis on class acceptance in Sections 1129(a)(8)
and 1129(b) means that the ability of an individual creditor
to block a plan through the voting process depends, in part,
on how claims are classified. And since plan proponents
enjoy considerable discretion in classifying claims,45
recalcitrant creditors generally find it difficult to garner
sufficient votes within their class and ensure that the plan
will not be "crammed down" over the objection of that class.
b. Section 524(g) Voting Rights
If a plan that includes asbestos claims does not invoke
Section 524(g), the asbestos creditors' ability to block
confirmation through voting is the same as any other
creditor's under Section 1129. As noted previously, if the
plan attempts to invoke the trust-injunction authorized
under Section 524(g), the injunction may issue only if the
court determines, among other things, "a separate class or
classes of [asbestos] claimants ... votes, by at least 75
Bankruptcy Code, § 1129(a)(10).
4 Id. at § 1122(a) requires only that claims within a class be
"substantially similar." Thus, courts have long recognized that "[a] debtor
in bankruptcy has considerable discretion to classify claims and interests
in a chapter 11 reorganizaion plan." In re Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, 72
F.3d 1305, 1321 (7th Cir. 1995).
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percent of those voting, in favor of the plan. .". ."' Section
524(g) does not include the ability to "cram down" an
injunction if fewer than 75% of asbestos creditors vote in
favor of the plan.47
The absence of a "cram down" option under Section 524(g)
removes a significant obstacle to transforming voting rights
into a veto power, but it does not resolve the practical
difficulties associated with gaining control over enough
claims to block a Section 524(g) injunction. This obstacle,
however, is far less significant for asbestos creditor claims
than other types of claims; over the years, control over the
overwhelming majority of asbestos claims has been
consolidated in the hands of a small number of law firms.48
In bankruptcy, these firms assert the power to speak and
cast large blocks of votes on behalf of their clients.49
An additional difficulty arises due to the fact that the
voting conditions under Sections 1129 and 524(g) are wholly
independent-acceptance by 75% of those in an asbestos
creditor class for the purposes of Section 524(g) may not be
sufficient to qualify as "acceptance" under Sections 1126(c)
and 1129. As Judge Bernstein recognized in Quigley, given
the wide disparity among the potential values of asbestos
claims, it is possible that a large block of low-value claimants
will vote in favor of a plan (thereby satisfying the super-
"6 Id. at § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb).
47 Century Indem. Co. v. Congoleum Corp. (In re Congoleum Corp.),
426 F.3d 675, 680 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Pre-packaged bankruptcies
employing a channeling injunction are not eligible for the "cram down"
provision contained in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) which allows the bankruptcy
court to confirm a plan of reorganization over creditors' objections in
certain circumstances.").
'8 Id. at 679 ("A unique feature of asbestos personal injury litigation is
the fact that a small group of law firms represents hundreds of thousands
of plaintiffs."); see also Frances McGovern, Asbestos Legislation II: Section
524(g) without Bankruptcy, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 233, 247-48 (2004) (noting
concentration of representation among a small group of lawyers).
" In re Congoleum, 426 F.3d at 680 ("The realities of securing
favorable votes from thousands of claimants to meet the 75% approval
requirement forces debtors to work closely with the few attorneys who
represent large numbers of injured claimants.").
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majority "number of claimants" requirement of Section
524(g)) while a much smaller number of high-value
claimants will vote against the plan (thereby preventing the
plan from satisfying the two-thirds "value of claims"
requirement of Section 1126(c)).5° Thus, the failure to obtain
this level of support may be fatal to any plan seeking to
employ the trust-injunction mechanism under Section
524(g).
This combination of factors creates a considerable barrier
to confirmation of any asbestos bankruptcy plan: lawyers
representing both a large number of claimants and those
representing claimants with large value claims must be
accommodated. Although representation of most asbestos
claimants is consolidated under a handful of law firms--each
arguably in position to block plan confirmation-no one
lawyer or firm controls enough claims to ensure a plan will
be confirmed. This effectively gives each of them the ability
to veto any Section 524(g) plan.5'
D. The Paradoxical Nature of Modern Asbestos
Bankruptcies
1. Redefining "Compromise" Under the Asbestos
Veto Threat
Against this backdrop, it should come as no surprise that
the Section 524(g) "veto power" over asbestos reorganization
plans has fundamentally altered the consensus-building
model of Chapter 11. Consensus is now more about the
satisfying the demands of the Controlling Firms than
o See, e.g., In re Quigley Co., 346 B.R. 647, 658 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2006).
"' Plevin, supra note 25, at 285 ("The inventory-holding law firms
claim a power of attorney for all of their claimants, which they can vote en
masse, giving them huge blocks of potential creditor votes for approval of
any asbestos bankruptcy plan and, at the other extreme, veto power over
any such plan.").
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obtaining mutual sacrifices among constituencies.52 The
resulting "negotiations" have thus been plagued by three
basic traits: attorney dominance; concealment of critical
information; and exclusion of dissenting voices. Each of
these traits is inconsistent with the traditional bankruptcy
negotiation model.
a. Attorney Dominance and Self-Dealing
The presumption that the Controlling Firms hold an
unassailable veto power leaves debtors, and other parties in
interest with the classic Hobson's choice-reorganization on
the Controlling Firms' terms or no reorganization at all. In
the interest of building this single-constituency-driven
consensus, debtors have been extremely deferential to the
Controlling Firms' demands. Recent bankruptcies were
largely driven (and in some cases originally suggested) by
one or two Controlling Firms, who, at times, demanded and
received direct 3 and indirect54 financial and other incentives
to settle their clients' claims and reach out to their
52 Todd R. Snyder & Deanne C. Siemer, Reply To Barliant: Asbestos
Pre-Packaged Bankruptcies: Apply The Brakes Carefully And Retain
Flexibility For Debtors, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 801, 803 (2005)
(arguing that Congress intended to give plaintiffs' lawyers greater control
over asbestos bankruptcies).
" See In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 187 n.14 (Bankr. D.N.J.
2007) (noting that the debtor paid lawyers at two Controlling Firms $1
million each and then "buried" a provision precluding any avoidance
actions to recover these funds in the plan with "no explanation for this
munificence"); see also In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 295 B.R. 459, 476
(Bankr. D. N.J. 2003) ($20 million payment to asbestos attorney Joe Rice
from the parent of the debtor); Ronald Barliant, Dimitri G. Karcazes &
Anne M. Sherry, From Free-Fall to Free-For-All: The Rise of Pre-Packaged
Asbestos Bankruptcies, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 441, 468 (discussing
conflicts of interest arising from payments to asbestos counsel in
Combustion Engineering and Congoleum).
"' Congoleum, 362 B.R. at 186 n.12 (noting that two cases presented
by one Controlling firm were settled pre-petition at $8 million each while
most other mesothelioma claims in another class would be capped at
$265,000); In Century Indemnity, the Third Circuit also noted the
preferred treatment afforded select claimants in the Congoleum case. In
re Congoleum., 426 F.3d at 680.
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colleagues in the bar.5 In some cases, the Controlling Firms
enjoyed largely unchecked control over key settlement
terms56 and the selection of critical players in the process,
including the appointment of the future claimants' legal
representative and certain of the debtors' counsel.
In most cases, the claims brought by key asbestos counsel
(or their co-counsel) were promised higher distributions and
faster payment than could be obtained in tort or a "free-fall"
57
bankruptcy." Among other things, the claims of favored law
firms would be settled and granted security interests in
advance of any bankruptcy filing.59 Some claims were settled
without any review, and the criteria used to review other
claims were largely dictated by the lawyers themselves.
Moreover, claim reviewers were often hand-picked by or
" Baron & Budd, P.C. v. Unsecured Asbestos Claimants Comm., 321
B.R. 147, 160 (D.N.J. 2005) ("Of particular relevance, is evidence that the
Motley Rice and Weitz & Luxenberg firms, which together purport to
'speak for' over 75 percent of all asbestos claimants against Congoleum,
may not in fact 'represent' individual claimants in the traditional sense of
an attorney-client relationship, but rather, they represent other attorneys
who, in turn, represent individual claimants.").
6 Congoleum, 362 B.R. at 196 ("[Tlhe claimants [sic] representatives
were the architects of the Claimants Agreement, which provided for
uneven treatment of asbestos creditors and created many of the
confirmation problems that have plagued this case.").
67 A "free-fall" bankruptcy is one in which most, if not all, of the
critical negotiations take place after the debtor is under bankruptcy
protection.
"8 Congoleum Corp. v. ACE Am. Ins. Co., No. MID-L-8908-01 (N.J.
Super. Ct. May 18, 2007) [hereinafter Stroumtsos Order] (finding claim
criteria inadequate because, among other reasons, the settlement
"significantly abandons viable defenses in the tort system, including
requirements of product identification, statute of limitations, and the
existence of deferred dockets"); accord David Austern & Raji Bhagavatula,
Not Over Yet, 107 BEST's REv. 74, 78 (2007) (noting lower standards for
payment from asbestos trusts).
" Barliant, supra note 53, at 454-58.
60 Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 833, 868-69 (2005) (demonstrating unprecedented control vested in
plaintiffs lawyers).
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affiliated with some of the law firms submitting claims." In
some cases, one or more of the Controlling Firms also
demanded a share of less influential lawyers' fees as a
condition of obtaining preferred status for their clients'
claims.62
A critical component of this approach was to structure the
settlements as "pre-packaged"" bankruptcies. These cases
tend to be confirmed quickly because support is effectively
locked up beforehand, thereby reducing the uncertainty
associated with a free-fall bankruptcy case.64 In an asbestos
bankruptcy, this can be particularly helpful because it
provides the debtor some comfort that the super-majority
voting requirement can be satisfied before it leaps into
Chapter 11.
Unlike traditional pre-packaged bankruptcies, recent
asbestos pre-packs were driven largely by the Controlling
Firms' desire to circumvent the Bankruptcy Code's equal
treatment provisions.65 As noted at the outset of this article,
61 In re ACandS, Inc., 297 B.R. 395, 398-99 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003)
(discussing the use of The Kenesis Group, LLC, and The Clearinghouse to
review claims).
62 Baron & Budd, P.C. v. Unsecured Asbestos Claimants Comm., 321
B.R. 147, 169 (D.N.J. 2005).
63 Pre-packaged bankruptcies are cases in which solicitation and
voting occur before the case commences. See, e.g., In re United Artists
Theatre Co., 315 F.3d 217, 224 n.5 (3d Cir. 2003); In re Pioneer Fin. Corp.,
246 B.R. 626, 630 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2000).
' John D. Ayer et al., Out-of-court Workouts, Prepacks and Pre-
arranged Cases: A Primer, AM. BANKR. INST. J. Apr. 2005, at 16 ("Unlike a
traditional chapter 11 case, the prepackaged bankruptcy is negotiated and
accepted by creditors before a proceeding is commenced in the bankruptcy
court. In theory, therefore, the prepackaged bankruptcy itself can be quick
(sometimes as fast as 30-45 days), and therefore less costly and damaging
to the restructuring company."); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S.
Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent
Corporations, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1357, 1375 (2000) ("The prepackaged
bankruptcy thus provides the firm with the benefit of class-wide voting to
minimize holdout problems, while simultaneously minimizing the time the
firm spends in bankruptcy.").
65 In fact, in one asbestos pre-pack, the asbestos plaintiffs' lawyer who
largely controlled its design and structure testified that "there's no reason
the Bankruptcy Code includes clear default rules-including
those governing the assessment, valuation, priority and
payment of claims-that may not be ignored for convenience
or perceived necessity once the debtor files bankruptcy.
Moreover, steps taken in the ninety days prior to the petition
date may be unwound after the case is filed.66 Thus, in order
to provide the incentives necessary to obtain the Controlling
Firms' support and ensure that those incentives would not be
unwound easily once the case was filed, the parties needed to
finalize these critical steps at least ninety days before
commencing Chapter 11 proceedings.
for -- for this pre-pack to have occurred unless the [preferred asbestos
claims] were receiving their security interest . . . ." In re Congoleum
Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 185 n.10 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (quoting the deposition
of Perry Weitz). As Plevin et al, explained:
The now-common structure used in asbestos pre-packs-a
pre-petition trust that pays a subset of current claimants
nearly full value for their claims, followed by a post-
petition trust that pays other current claimants and future
claimants a much smaller percentage of their claims, with
significantly more stringent qualifying requirements-
financially benefits the lawyers for the preferred claimants,
since they typically receive, as contingent fee payments, as
much as 40 cents of each dollar paid to their claimants.
Because their clients get paid more, and sooner, than other
claimants, these lawyers personally benefit when the plan
is structured in such a fashion. If the plan treated all
claimants the same, paying all current claimants through
the mechanism of a post-petition trust, the lawyers for the
current claimants would make less money-even assuming
the bankruptcy court or the trust made no effort to restrict
the portion of a trust beneficiary's payment that could be
paid as a contingent fee. This, as much as anything,
explains why asbestos pre-packs are structured in such a
byzantine fashion that is so different than any
"conventional" asbestos bankruptcy case.
Mark D. Plevin, Robert T. Ebert & Leslie A. Epley, Pre-Packaged Asbestos
Bankruptcies: A Flawed Solution, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 883, 912-13 (2003).
6 Bankruptcy Code § 547(b)(4)(A) (ninety-day preference period).
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b. Concealment of Critical Information
The Controlling Firms' ability to provide sufficient
asbestos votes to guarantee confirmation is only as strong as
(a) the validity of the underlying claims and (b) the
Controlling Firms' authority to control the votes of those
claims. Put differently, if either element is successfully
challenged, the law firms' support may no longer provide
sufficient assurance that a plan negotiated with those firms
will succeed. Even if the law firms are able to establish both
elements, any litigation over these significant points may
delay confirmation significantly. To that end, pre-pack
proponents have found it desirable to avoid inquiry into
these issues to the extent possible.
c. Authority to File and Vote on Behalf of
Asbestos Victims
The Controlling Firms' legal authority to appear and vote
in asbestos bankruptcy cases is purely representative; they
nominally speak for victims, not themselves. Under the
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019(a), attorneys are
ordinarily required to substantiate their authority to
represent multiple creditors.67  Although this basic
67 In relevant part, Bankruptcy Rule 2019(a) provides:
In a... chapter 11 reorganization case, except with respect
to a committee appointed pursuant to § 1102 or 1114 of the
Code, every entity or committee representing more than
one creditor ... shall file a verified statement setting forth
(1) the name and address of the creditor or equity security
holder; (2) the nature and amount of the claim or interest
and the time of acquisition thereof unless it is alleged to
have been acquired more than one year prior to the filing of
the petition; (3) a recital of the pertinent facts and
circumstances in connection with the employment of the
entity or indenture trustee, and, in the case of a committee,
the name or names of the entity or entities at whose
instance, directly or indirectly, the employment was
arranged or the committee was organized or agreed to act;
and (4) with reference to the time of the employment of the
entity, the organization or formation of the committee, or
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requirement might suggest that parties in interest are able
to scrutinize the Controlling Firms' authority in asbestos
bankruptcy cases, most bankruptcy courts have required
Controlling Firms only to file "sample" authorizations and
allowed Controlling Firms to withhold "co-counsel" and
similar agreements altogether. In short, in most cases, it is
impossible to discern who a given law firm represents or the
scope of that representation, notwithstanding Bankruptcy
Rule 2019(a).
d. Claim Filings and Support
Given the dollar values involved and the inherent
difficulties in establishing an enforceable asbestos personal
injury claim,6" those parties in interest that oppose an
asbestos pre-pack-primarily insurers and creditors who
believe they have been disenfranchised-may have
substantial financial incentives to pursue claim-by-claim
objections. 9  In practice, these potential "spoilers" enjoy
the appearance in the case of any indenture trustee, the
amounts of claims or interests owned by the entity, the
members of the committee or the indenture trustee, the
times when acquired, the amounts paid therefor, and any
sales or other disposition thereof. The statement shall
include a copy of the instrument, if any, whereby the
entity, committee, or indenture trustee is empowered to act
on behalf of creditors or equity security holders.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a).
" For example, many claimants struggle to identify the source of
exposure by the time they are diagnosed. Lawrence Martin, Asbestos
Lung Disease: A Primer for Patients, Physicians, and Lawyers, J.
CONTROVERSIAL MED. CLAIMS, Nov. 2001, at 15, 17 (2000) ("[In about half
the [mesotheliomal cases, there is no history of asbestos exposure, and the
cause is unknown."). This may be even more difficult with second- and
third-tier defendants who now make up a far larger portion of the pool of
asbestos defendants. See Jeffrey M. Davidson, Theories of Asbestos
Litigation Costs-Why Two Decades of Procedural Reform Have Failed to
Reduce Claimants'Expenses, 7 NEV. L.J. 73, 91 (2006).
9 Even the extremely lenient Manville Trust medical audit revealed
that the trust may have paid $190 million for fraudulent or inflated claims
from 1996 to 2001. Roger Parloff, Mass Tort Medicine Men, AM. LAw., Jan.
3, 2003, at 97. Thus, those inclined to challenge claims may reasonably
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little, if any, opportunity to do so because courts routinely
excuse counsel from filing proof of claim forms and
supporting documentation."0  The debtors' schedules7
contain sparse information, if any, and even the minimal
information provided to asbestos claim processors is rarely
subjected to independent scrutiny. In those rare cases, the
parties investigating the claims are required to execute strict
confidentiality agreements (or are bound by confidentiality
orders), so the prospects that any dramatic discoveries will
become public are limited. This is true even where the
discovery has little to do with the asserted bases for
confidentiality; for example, evidence that a law firm has
filed claims on behalf of long-deceased victims or asserted
claims for clients that have no idea who the attorneys are
may remain outside public scrutiny.
Although the potential for fraud is obvious, the
suggestion that a particular lawyer or law firm is guilty of
misconduct in a given case is not one to be made lightly. In
fact, courts regularly bar inquiry without specific evidence of
fraud in the cases before them. This is true even when the
known facts suggest, at a minimum, that the firms could not
have performed even a cursory investigation of the claims
filed before dumping them on a bankruptcy settlement
processor. Moreover, because basic information about
believe that the costs of doing so are justified by potential savings in
claims paid.
" See, e.g., In re Congoleum Corp., 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 303, at *12-13
(denying request to set a bar date for asbestos claims because, among
other reasons, doing so would open the door to an avalanche of claim
objections); In re Quigley Co., 346 B.R. 647, 653 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006)
("Many asbestos cases, including this one, excuse asbestos claimants from
the requirement to file claims because of the practical difficulties
involved.").
" Bankruptcy Rule 1007(c) requires debtors to file schedules of assets
and liabilities within fifteen days after the filing of a voluntary Chapter 11
petition. Although Official Forms 6D (Schedule D-Creditors Holding
Secured Claims) and 6F (Schedule F-Creditors Holding Unsecured
Nonpriority Claims) require only minimal information about claims-the
name and address of the claimant, the dollar amount, and the date the
claim was incurred-even this information is largely omitted from the
debtors' schedules in many asbestos bankruptcy cases.
asbestos claims is not available, it is ordinarily impossible
for opponents to cross-reference claims across bankruptcy
trusts and cases to unearth wholly inconsistent
representations. In short, parties in interest face a
conundrum-fraudulent claims cannot be investigated
unless they are discovered, but they cannot be discovered
unless they are investigated.
e. Exclusion of Dissenting Voices
In many recent asbestos pre-packs, two litigious blocks-
insurers (who are usually expected to provide most of the
funding for the trusts) and disfavored creditors (including
some asbestos claimants)-were generally excluded from
pre-petition negotiations.72 These parties have considerable
interests that are contrary to the Controlling Firms.
Concessions to these parties would weaken recoveries for
Controlling Firms; and involving these other parties without
providing any significant concessions could provide dramatic
evidence that any proposed plan was collusive and
fundamentally unfair, in contravention of the Code.
Moreover, allowing these parties to participate would require
giving them additional information as negotiations evolved-
information that could be used against the plan proponents
in the likely event that the disfavored parties rejected any
deal that the Controlling Firms demanded.
The efforts to exclude insurers gained considerable
ground following the Fuller-Austin bankruptcy. In that case,
the insurers' objections to confirmation were rejected on
standing grounds because the plan included a "super-
peremptory" clause that nominally preserved all of the
insurers' rights in coverage litigation.73 After the plan was
confirmed, however, the bankruptcy trust switched course
and claimed that the plan was binding on the insurers. 4 The
72 See Plevin et al., supra note 65, at 889.
v In re Fuller-Austin Insulation, No. 98-2038-JJF, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18340, at *13 (D. Del. Nov. 10, 1998).
14 As the California Court of Appeals later noted in reversing the trial
court's order, the plan proponents advised the bankruptcy court:
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trial court agreed with the plan proponents; although the
insurers were actively excluded from challenging the plan in
the bankruptcy case, its confirmation required them to pay
the full value of their policies immediately.75 After Fuller-
Austin, one of the leading architects of asbestos pre-packs
characterized his resulting leverage over insurers in these
cases as god-like," so the decision to actively exclude
[Tihese proceedings have absolutely no impact on the
proceedings in California in terms of the claims and
defenses that those carriers have raised and are litigating
in California .... I think we have made perfectly clear in
our amendment to the plan of reorganization that [the
carriers'] rights are not affected, and we have made
perfectly clear in our amended plan that their claims and
defenses in the coverage litigation is [sic] not affected.
Fuller-Austin Insulation Co. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716,
725 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). Once the state court litigation resumed following
Fuller-Austin's confirmation, however, "Fuller-Austin adopted a position it
did not take in the bankruptcy proceedings; it asserted that its confirmed
Plan was a final adjudication that established its liability to asbestos
claimants and therefore obligated appellants to pay the full ALV
established by the bankruptcy court with respect to each asbestos claim."
Id. at 726.
7' As explained by the California Court of Appeals:
The trial court agreed with Fuller-Austin's new position,
ruling that "Fuller-Austin's confirmed bankruptcy plan is a
binding federal court judgment and adjudication that
establishes Fuller-Austin's liability and its legal
obligations to pay damages to all pending and future
asbestos claimants." It found that the bankruptcy
proceedings constituted an "actual trial" of Fuller-Austin's
liability; alternatively, it reasoned that the Plan
constituted a "settlement" for which appellants' consent
was unnecessary because appellants had received notice of
and an opportunity to participate in the bankruptcy
proceedings.
Id.
7' In characterizing this leverage at a conference in June 2003, Scott
Gilbert analogized the pre-pack proponents' and insurers' positions to the
lead character and a gang of thugs, respectively, in a scene from the film
BRUCE ALMIGHTY. In this scene, Bruce demands an apology from the gang.
After the lead thug responds, "When a monkey comes out of my butt, you'll
insurers from negotiations following Fuller-Austin is hardly
surprising.
2. Case Study: Congoleurn's Difficult March
Through Bankruptcy
Congoleum Corporation and its predecessors in interest
produced asbestos-containing flooring products until the
early 1980s.77 During its first two decades as an asbestos
personal injury defendant, the company successfully
defended the overwhelming majority of its lawsuits.78 Like
many other second-tier asbestos personal injury defendants,
however, the number of lawsuits filed against Congoleum
increased dramatically during the first part of this decade.79
During negotiations concerning two mesothelioma personal
injury cases with Perry Weitz, a key member of one of the
Controlling Firms, he suggested that the company consider
pursuing a pre-packaged bankruptcy case.8°
Congoleum's subsequent bankruptcy planning and filing
followed the same model that other confirmed and then-
get your sorry;" Bruce, now holding divine powers, makes precisely that
happen. (Author notes).
" Congoleum Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 10 (Sept. 30,
2002).
78 Most of the cases against Congoleum were dismissed during this
period, and the company's aggregate defense and settlement costs during
this time were roughly $13.5 million, which was paid by the company's
primary insurer. See Id. at 10-11.
79 For example, as of December 31, 2002, Congoleum faced twenty-
four times more asbestos personal injury lawsuits than it faced just three
years earlier (including a nine-fold increase in the number of plaintiffs
naming Congoleum as a defendant). Congoleum Corp. Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 51 (Dec. 31, 2002) (noting that there were approximately
16,156 known asbestos personal injury lawsuits on behalf of 56,567
individuals pending against the company as of December 31, 2002);
Congoleum Corp. Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10 (Dec. 31, 1999)
(approximately 670 asbestos personal injury lawsuits on behalf of 6,246
individuals were pending against the company as of December 31, 1999).
" Century Indem. Co. v. Congoleum Corp. (In re Congoleum Corp.),
426 F.3d 675, 681 (3d Cir. 2005).
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pending asbestos bankruptcies used.8 Unfortunately for
Congoleum, critical elements of its asbestos pre-pack
strategy had not been tested to final judgment; many
disputes had been settled before appeals were final, and
disputes over other significant issues were still being
litigated during Congoleum's pre-bankruptcy planning
period. By the time that courts started condemning the
asbestos pre-pack model, Congoleum was firmly committed
to this strategy. Thus, Congoleum's experience provides a
framework for discussing many critical legal developments
in asbestos bankruptcies and also illustrates the Controlling
Firms' and other parties' respective perceptions of the
process as these developments occurred.
a. Basic Process and Structure
The basic elements of asbestos pre-packs before
Congoleum-control, exclusion, and preferential treatment-
are easy to identify in Congoleum's case. First, consistent
with the control demanded by key lawyers in other cases,
two lawyers from Controlling Firms directed the Congoleum
process as self-styled "Claimants Counsel.""2  For the
debtors, a significant portion of the bankruptcy planning and
early settlement negotiations were handled by Gilbert
Heintz & Randolph, the firm recommended by one of the
Claimants Counsel." Kenesis Group, LLP, an affiliate of
Gilbert Heintz, was hired to review and process claims. 4
Kenesis, in turn, "subcontracted its work to The
Clearinghouse LLC, an organization owned by an individual
who was on leave of absence from a position as a paralegal at
[Claimant Counsel] Joseph Rice's law firm." 5
81 Id. at 680 ("The pre-petition activity that occurred in [Congoleum] is
fairly typical of that in a number of asbestos pre-packaged plans.").
82 Id. at 680-81.
Id. at 681 (reversing order retaining debtor's law firm).
8 Id. at 683.
85 Id. at 684 n.11. Kenesis ultimately agreed to acquire The
Clearinghouse prior to the filing of Congoleum's Chapter 11 petition. Id.
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Second, the parties largely followed the script for
excluding those who might object to the terms of the deal.
Insurers were excluded from any meaningful input in the
pre-bankruptcy planning and negotiations," and the pre-
petition future claimants' representative was not hired until
after the deal was essentially done .8  Although initially left
out of discussions, attorneys representing a block of the most
seriously ill asbestos victims were ultimately brought into
the pre-petition discussions," apparently in response to this
group's successful tactics in other cases.
Third, and most significant, the parties structured the
pre-petition settlements and the bankruptcy plan such that
comparable claims were divided into subclasses, and these
separate classes were secured at different levels.89 Thus,
asbestos plaintiffs with similar injuries would be entitled to
substantially different recoveries under the plan.
On December 31, 2003, after the preference period
passed, Congoleum commenced its Chapter 11 case.
However, significant problems for the Congoleum pre-pack
were percolating even before its filing. Among other things,
the company used by Congoleum to process asbestos claims
had been roundly criticized for its conduct in another
asbestos case just a few months earlier," and the Congoleum
plan proponents' hard-line strategy against its insurers had
not yielded any significant insurance settlements. To the
contrary, it backfired badly, as most of these insurers dug in
for a long, arduous battle.
86 Stroumtsos Order, supra note 58, at 10-11.
87 Plevin et al., supra note 25, at 306-7.
For example, one of the lead attorneys for the "Cancer Claimants"
in the Combustion Engineering bankruptcy, Steve Kazan, was added to
the pre-petition asbestos claimants' committee in Congoleum. See
Proposed Disclosure Statement With Respect to Tenth Modified Plan at
§3.3, In re Congoleum Corp., No. 03-51524 (KCF), Dkt. No. 4565.
89 Id. at 680-81.
o In re ACandS, Inc., 297 B.R. 395 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (denying
motion to retain The Kenesis Group, LLC as asbestos claims processing
agent).
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b. The ACandS Confirmation Order
Perhaps the most staggering early blow to the Congoleum
case came less than one month after Congoleum filed its
petition: Judge Newsome's opinion and order denying
confirmation of a similar asbestos pre-pack plan in the
ACandS bankruptcy case. Congoleum's pre-pack was
designed in large part on the ACandS model, involved many
of the same key players, and even allowed claimants to rely
on claim eligibility determinations from the ACandS case.
Judge Newsome's opinion went further than merely
questioning the legality of the plan; he criticized its
fundamental assumptions and the equities involved, limiting
Congoleum's ability to distinguish ACandS in any significant
way.
First, although the ACandS plan may have satisfied the
super-majority voting requirement of Section
524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV), Judge Newsome concluded that the
approach used to obtain the lawyers' support made it
impossible to "provide reasonable assurance that the trust
will value, and be in a financial position to pay, present
claims and future demands that involve similar claims in
substantially the same manner," as required by Section
524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V):
The trust established in ACandS' plan of
reorganization does nothing of the kind. Not only
does the plan discriminate between present and
future claims, it pays similar claims in a totally
disparate manner by giving preferential treatment to
certain claimants who are secured by insurance
proceeds. Those security interests were not granted
based upon the medical condition of those claimants,
but rather because, for whatever reason, they were
first in line and able to carve out seemingly
unassailable security interests. Nothing could be
further from what the drafters of Section 524(g)
intended.91
"' In re ACandS, Inc., 311 B.R. 36, 42 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004).
Judge Newsome further concluded that the debtors gave
far too much authority to opposing counsel in the claim
review process, contrary to Section 1129(a)(3)'s "good faith"
requirement:
The plan under consideration falls short of this [good
faith] standard in nearly every respect. Although
ACandS was represented during the course of the
prepackage negotiations, the correspondence among
plaintiffs' asbestos counsel presented at trial
indicates that the plan was largely drafted by and for
the benefit of the prepetition committee. It was the
prepetition committee that drafted (or more likely
directed debtor's counsel in drafting) the prepetition.
trust, and apparently chose the trustee for the trust;
it was the prepetition committee that decided how
the security agreement would be crafted and how
many classes of security interests would be formed;
and it was the prepetition committee that decided
who was going to get what. ACandS was there to do
their bidding, having been thrown overboard by Irex
to keep what was left of that company afloat. Given
the unbridled dominance of the committee in the
debtor's affairs and actions during the prepetition
period, its continued influence flowing from its
majority status on the post-petition creditors
committee, and the obvious self-dealing that resulted
from control of the debtor, it is impossible to conclude
that the plan was consistent with the objectives and
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.92
Finally, because the arrangement differentiated claims
based on extra-legal factors (i.e., the influence of the lawyers
bringing the claims and timing) rather than the "legal
character" of the claims, its classification scheme would be
particularly prejudicial to some of the most seriously ill
asbestos claimants:
Although the plan may meet the technical
classification requirements of § 1122 and § 1129(b), it
is fundamentally unfair that one claimant with non-
92 Id. at 43 (citation omitted).
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symptomatic pleural plaques will be paid in full,
while someone with mesothelioma runs the
substantial risk of receiving nothing. Both should be
compensated based on the nature of their injuries,
not based on the influence and cunning of their
lawyers. The court is informed that other judges
have confirmed plans with such discriminatory
classifications. This judge cannot do so in good
93conscience.
All of these issues plagued the Congoleum case at least as
much as they had in ACandS. Still, the Controlling Firms
balked at any significant departures from the asbestos pre-
pack model, generally, or the terms of the deal in Congoleum,
specifically. Moreover, because Judge Newsome's opinion
also reinforced previous case law limiting insurer standing,
the Congoleum plan proponents may have reasonably
believed that the ACandS ruling would effectively allow
them to exclude insurers from the confirmation hearings in
Congoleum, thereby removing the only parties that were
likely to raise significant challenges to the plan in that case.
c. Combustion Engineering
Later that year, the Third Circuit reversed an order
confirming the plan in another similar asbestos pre-pack
case, Combustion Engineering. Much like Judge Newsome's
opinion in ACandS, the Combustion Engineering opinion was
highly critical of the asbestos pre-pack strategy and its
emphasis on form over substance. After rejecting the lower
court's decision to enjoin asbestos actions against the
debtor's non-debtor affiliates,94 the court zeroed in on the
inequitable treatment of claims under the scheme:
The pre-petition transfer in this case also implicates
the fundamental bankruptcy policy of "equality of
distribution among creditors." In this regard, we
consider the bankruptcy scheme as an integrated
whole in order to evaluate whether Plan confirmation
93 Id.
" In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 233-38 (3d Cir. 2004).
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is warranted. Viewing the Combustion Engineering
pre-pack bankruptcy as a whole, the record reveals
that it may lack the requisite equality of distribution
among creditors. The Plan, as it relates to asbestos
claimants, consists of two elements: the pre-petition
CE Settlement Trust and the post-petition Asbestos
PI Trust. Under this interdependent, two-trust
framework, the Certain Cancer Claimants, the future
asbestos claimants, and other non-parties to the pre-
petition settlement appear to receive a demonstrably
unequal share of the limited Combustion
Engineering fund. 5
The panel further questioned the disparate treatment for
(a) current impaired and unimpaired claims and (b) favored
current claims and future demands." Finally, the court
concluded that the pre-petition manipulation of claims was
designed for the improper purpose of buying critical votes:
Here, Combustion Engineering made pre-petition
payments to current asbestos claimants that
exceeded any recovery obtainable by other current
asbestos claimants (such as the Certain Cancer
Claimants) in bankruptcy. As a result, the CE
Settlement Trust participants, many of whom
received as much as 95% of the full liquidated value
of their claims pre-petition, had little incentive to
scrutinize the terms of the proposed Plan. Rather,
their incentive appears to have been otherwise, given
that the favorable pre-petition settlements were
conditioned, at least implicitly, on a subsequent vote
in favor of the Plan.97
With respect to the representation of future claimants,
the Third Circuit expressed concern about the absence of a
future claimants' representative during the critical early
stages of the negotiations." As a result, the modifications
9- Id. at 241-42 (citations omitted).
Id. at 242.
9' Id. at 244 (citations omitted).
" Id. at 245 ("Here, the first phase of the integrated, global
settlement-the establishment of the CE Settlement Trust-included
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made during this stage undermined the facially
overwhelming vote in favor of the plan:
Had the future and other non-participating asbestos
claimants been adequately represented throughout
the reorganization process, including the CE
Settlement Trust negotiations, then perhaps the
corresponding stub claims would demonstrate the
"indicia of support by affected creditors" required
under § 1129(a)(10). But they were not. Instead, as
discussed, a disfavored group of asbestos claimants,
including the future claimants and the Certain
Cancer Claimants, were not involved in the first
phase of this integrated settlement. The result was a
Plan ratified by a majority of "stub votes" cast by the
very claimants who obtained preferential treatment
from the debtor. As noted, an estimated 99,000 of
the approximately 115,000 "valid" confirmation votes
appear to have been stub claim votes. Given this
structural inadequacy, the Plan may have lacked the
requisite "indicia of support" among creditors.99
Practically speaking, however, Combustion Engineering
may have inadvertently reinforced the pre-pack strategy in
Congoleum. Although the court found numerous flaws with
the approach, it also effectively limited the right to appeal
these issues to the "Cancer Claimants" who were excluded
from negotiations in that case but included in the Congoleum
negotiations. With the only group with standing to appeal
these issues firmly in support of the Congoleum pre-pack,
then, the plan proponents may have reasonably believed that
the plan could survive any challenge in spite of its many
flaws. To that end, most of Congoleum's subsequent plan
amendments involved several modest, superficial changes
but did not address the fundamental concerns identified in
Combustion Engineering."'
neither representation nor funding for future and other non-participating
claimants.").
Id. (citations omitted).
100 See discussion infra Section I.D.2.f.
d. Century Indemnity v. Congoleum Corp.
Another blow to Congoleum's pre-pack arose within the
case: the disqualification of Gilbert Heintz, the debtors'
counsel in its pre-petition planning stage and its post-
petition "special insurance counsel." After receiving
repeatedly favorable rulings limiting insurers' standing to
litigate and appeal critical aspects of asbestos pre-packs, the
plan proponents may have believed that the appeal of the
firm's retention would fail regardless of the significant
ethical and substantive problems that the firm's activities
raised. In stark contrast to its discussion of insurer standing
in Combustion Engineering, however, the Third Circuit
concluded that insurers and their counsel had standing to
appeal the firm's retention:
Here, the insurers are entitled to standing even
under the more restrictive standard applied to
bankruptcy proceedings. The retention of special
insurance counsel is an important preliminary
matter that will profoundly affect the determination
of the validity of a proposed plan ab initio. It is an
issue based on procedural due process concerns that
implicate the integrity of the bankruptcy court
proceeding as a whole. The retention of Gilbert as
special insurance counsel will affect the resolution of
issues that may directly affect the rights of insurers
and fairness to the asbestos claimants. 1 1
After concluding that the firm's role in the bankruptcy
required its application to be evaluated under Section 327(a)
rather than the far less restrictive standards of Section
327(e), 10 2 the court noted the firm's repeated refusals to
101 Century Indem. Co. v. Congoleum Corp. (In re Congoleum Corp.),
426 F.3d 675, 685 (3d Cir. 2005).
102 Section 327(a) applies to professionals retained "to represent or
assist the trustee [or debtor in possession] in carrying out [its] duties
under this title", 11 U.S.C. § 327(a), while Section 327(e) authorizes the
retention of attorneys "for a specified special purpose . . . ." 11 U.S.C. §
327(e). Attorneys retained under either provision must not hold or
represent an "interest adverse to the estate", but attorneys retained under
Section 327(a) must also be "disinterested." 11 U.S.C. § 327. Among other
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disclose critical information about its relationship with Perry
Weitz and asbestos plaintiffs with claims against
Congoleum."'0 Even without this additional information,
however, the panel readily concluded that the firm was not
"disinterested" under Section 327(a).
10 4
After the Gilbert Heintz firm's retention was reversed,
additional documents that were not disclosed in connection
with its retention or in response to numerous applicable
document requests (and omitted from its privilege logs)
during the case demonstrated that the firm's contractual
relationships with claimants' counsel were far more
sweeping than previously realized. 105 Of particular relevance
to this discussion, the firm was recommended to Congoleum
by Perry Weitz-and settled two of his clients' asbestos
personal injury claims against Congoleum for $8 million
each-less than one month after Weitz and Gilbert Heintz
entered into a previously undisclosed global asbestos fee-
sharing agreement. 0 6 Even if it is in any way conceivable
that this global relationship somehow slipped the minds of
the attorneys at the time that Gilbert Heintz agreed to the
$16 million settlement-an amount exceeding the company's
reasons, the Third Circuit concluded that the firm "continues to
participate actively in formulating and revising the plan" and reasoned
that its efforts to distinguish its advice concerning insurance recovery and
other matters "might be likened to attempts at using a scalpel to carve a
bowl of soup." In re Congoleum, 426 F.3d at 692. Accordingly, the court
readily concluded that the firm's retention had to be considered under the
heightened standard of Section 327(a).
'0' Id. at 690.
o' Id. at 692 ("Our discussion of the Rules of Professional Conduct
demonstrates that Gilbert also cannot meet the Bankruptcy Code's
requirement of disinterestness contained in section 327(a). Its status as
co-counsel with Weitz and its ownership interest in Kenesis represent
factors which prevent Gilbert from being completely loyal to Congoleum's
interests.").
"o Declaration of Kerry A. Brennan Relating to Debtors' Objection to
Motion of Gilbert, Heintz & Randolph LLP for a Stay Pending Appeal with
Respect to the GHR Disgorgement Order, In re Congoleum Corp., No. 03-
51524 (KCF), Dkt. No. 3971 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2006).
" Id. ("Relationship Letter" from Scott Gilbert to Perry Weitz, dated
Sept. 3, 2002).
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aggregate asbestos defense and settlement costs throughout
its history-as Congoleum's nominal counsel, the ongoing
concealment of such a fundamental conflict of interest over a
period of years raises, at best, serious questions about the
firm's claims that it acted in good faith in that case." 7 As the
bankruptcy court noted from the bench, "the conflict at issue
here existed from the outset of the case and was of such a
nature that it necessarily permeated every aspect of [Gilbert
Heintz]'s decision-making." 8
e. Coverage Litigation
Given the extensive role that Gilbert Heintz played in the
Congoleum pre-pack and the firm's widely-criticized conflicts
of interest in the case, few were surprised when the trial
court overseeing the lawsuit between Congoleum and its
insurers ruled against the company on May 18, 2007. Still,
notwithstanding the various plan proponents' efforts to
downplay the significance of the ruling, Judge Stroumstos'
opinion undermined whatever rationalizations might have
remained available to support confirmation of a plan that
relied upon key elements of the pre-pack. In addition to the
practical impact of the order, barring recovery from the only
substantial source of funds for the trust, many of the legal
and factual justifications for the order-pervasive conflicts of
interest, payment of claims that would not be paid in the tort
system, inflated claim values and weak exposure and
medical criteria-were relevant to plan confirmation.' 9
Sounding a now familiar refrain, the court reserved its
harshest criticism for Gilbert Heintz's "actual conflict of
interest because of its relationship with Weitz and his law
firm, including their joint representation of claimants with
107 See Scott Gilbert, Letter to the Editor, No Conflict of Interest in the
Congoleum Case, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2006, at A17.
108 Transcript of February 7, 2007 Hearing at 19, In re Congoleum
Corp., No. 03-51524, Dkt. No. 3582.
'o Stroumtsos Order, supra note 58, at 10-11.
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claims against Congoleum"n ° and its "collu[sion]" with that
firm to manufacture liability.'11
f. Congoleum's Response to Date
To date, Congoleum's original "pre-pack" plan has been
amended a dozen times, with many of those amendments
evincing the company's struggle to address the flaws
identified by the various courts without alienating the
Controlling Firms. Indeed, the one amendment that
contemplated the elimination of the preferential treatment
demanded by Claimants Counsel's pre-petition-the sixth
amended plan-was subsequently withdrawn by the debtors
when they learned that one of the Claimants Counsel, Perry
Weitz, would not support it.1 2 After repeated amendments
that were, at best, superficially responsive but substantively
insufficient to address the courts' concerns, the bankruptcy
court stressed that the continued separate classification of
comparable asbestos claims would render any plan
110 Id. at 11-12.
... Id. at 11. Less directly, the court's reservations about the manner
in which the firm and Claimants Counsel "negotiated" with insurers are
also apparent:
GHR, Rice and Weitz invited the insurers to meetings on
March 13, 2003 in South Carolina and March 20, 2003 in
New York; however, no real negotiations took place at that
meeting. One meeting was delayed while Scott Gilbert and
Joe Rice were enjoying the afternoon looking at custom
made motorcycles. In addition at each of the meeting the
insurance carriers were told discussions would advance
only after they agreed to tender their policies. The
insurers did not receive a draft of the Claimant Agreement
until March 7, 2003. Congoleum later provided the
insurers with revised drafts of the settlement documents,
but only after an agreement in principle had been reached
with Weitz and Rice without consulting the insurers.
Id.
112 See Proposed Disclosure Statement with Respect to Tenth Modified
Plan at §5.13, In re Congoleum Corp., No. 03-51524(KCF), Dkt. No. 4565.
"unconfirmable on its face."113  As the bankruptcy court
explained:
In this case, the fact that the Debtors granted pre-
petition security interests to certain favored creditors
and then purposefully waited more than 90 days to
file in order to protect those security interests
evinces a scheme designed to circumvent the Code's
equal distribution requirements. As a result,
confirmation of a plan that in any way recognizes
those pre-petition security interests is not
permissible.14
The legal conditions of confirmation may ultimately be
satisfied in Congoleum, but its example is understandably
discouraging for other companies that may benefit from a
bankruptcy filing. Even if the Controlling Firms embrace a
legally-sufficient plan in Congoleum at this late stage,
history suggests that they will continue exercising the
asbestos veto power to press the boundaries of the Code in
other cases. Moreover, the asbestos veto threat may
discourage companies from filing until after the Controlling
Firms have stripped considerable assets from the estate
through the tort system-if they cannot front-load recoveries
in bankruptcy, they can use the threat of liquidation to
prevent bankruptcy filings and continue front-loading
recoveries in tort. Thus, rather than advancing the
reorganization goal of bankruptcy law, the asbestos veto may
be employed to prevent companies from pursuing timely
restructuring plans.
3. Prospects for Future Asbestos Bankruptcies
Following the Third Circuit's rejection of the Combustion
Engineering plan, asbestos defendants understandably
became uncomfortable with the asbestos pre-pack strategy.
Crane Co., for example, expressly noted the opinion as "a
material change in the case law regarding Section 524(g)
transactions" and terminated its Master Settlement
11 In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 182 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007).
114 Id. at 186.
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Agreement with the Controlling Firms. 115  The company
remains embroiled in asbestos litigation in the tort system
and recently increased its pre-tax asbestos provision to more
than $1 billion to account for asbestos liability through
2017.116
The precise number of pre-pack negotiations that may
have been derailed by the Combustion Engineering reversal
or other recent developments in asbestos bankruptcies is
difficult to quantify because of the secretive nature of these
negotiations. Moreover, recent state tort reform efforts,
Judge Janis Jack's blistering condemnation of client
recruiting screenings in the silica MDL, and other
developments in asbestos personal injury tort cases have
given many asbestos defendants considerable breathing
room; so at least some defendants may be taking a wait-and-
see approach to asbestos bankruptcy planning. At present,
however, considerable uncertainties remain.
III. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE ASBESTOS
BANKRUPTCY PARADOX
The difficulties encountered by Congoleum highlight the
degree to which bankruptcy law is guided by a number of
distinct, sometimes conflicting principles." 7  As noted
previously, one of the key goals of the Bankruptcy Code is to
promote reorganization-a goal that Section 524(g) is clearly
intended to advance. Practically speaking, however, the
super-majority vote requirement may be impossible to satisfy
without providing asbestos creditors significant financial
incentives, which, as demonstrated in ACandS and
". Crane Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 17 (Dec. 31, 2006).
116 Crane Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 18 (Dec. 31, 2007).
..7 Patrick J. Borchers, Choice of Law Relative to Security Interests
and Other Liens in International Bankruptcies, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 165,
171-72 (1998). But see In re Greene, 103 B.R. 83, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (in a
different context, noting that "the need to ensure the integrity and
fairness of the process while at the same time providing assurance to the
debtor that the fresh-start goal will be reasonably and timely realized,
barring complications, if the process is utilized in good faith" are "neither
competing nor incompatible.").
Combustion Engineering, will violate provisions that serve
other fundamental goals of bankruptcy law: equal
treatment11 and fundamental fairness.119 If a party whose
interests are impaired objects, even the overwhelming
support of creditors as a whole or those within the objecting
party's class will not render the plan confirmable. 2 °
Accepting this paradox at face value will condemn
increasingly tangential asbestos defendants to failure-
Chapter 11 may be the only option for many of these
companies,"' and the paradox may prevent them from
reorganizing-to the detriment of most, if not all, of their
creditors and other constituencies. This reality may explain
why few openly acknowledge the asbestos bankruptcy
paradox or suggest that it is absolute. Yet ignoring the
118 Howard Delivery Serv. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 655,
(2006) ("[Tlhe Bankruptcy Code aims, in the main, to secure equal
distribution among creditors."); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990)
("Equality of distribution among creditors is a central policy of the
Bankruptcy Code."); Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 210 (1945)
("[Hlistorically one of the prime purposes of the bankruptcy law has been
to bring about a ratable distribution among creditors of a bankrupt's
assets; to protect the creditors from one another."); Clarke v. Rogers, 228
U.S. 534, 548 (1913) ("Equality between creditors is necessarily the
ultimate aim of the bankrupt[cy] law, and to obtain it we must regard the
essential nature of transactions . . . ."); In re Lakeside Cmty. Hosp., 151
B.R. 887, 893 (N.D. Ill. 1993) ("Congress designed the Bankruptcy Code to
provide for equal and consistent treatment among similarly situated
creditors."). In Howard Delivery, the Supreme Court further noted the
"complementary principle that preferential treatment of a class of
creditors is in order only when clearly authorized by Congress." 547 U.S.
at 655 (emphasis added).
119 Eisenberg Bros. v. Clear Shield Nat'l (In re Envirodyne Indus.), 214
B.R. 338, 349 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("The goal of bankruptcy is to provide
fairness among creditors and thereafter to give a debtor a fresh start.").
120 In re Texaco, Inc., 84 B.R. 893, 899 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding
that a plan supported by 96% of the only impaired class must still satisfy
the other requirements of the Code to be confirmed).
121 Georgene Vairo, Mass Torts Bankruptcies: The Who, The Why and
The How, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 93, 128 (2004) ("[Gliven the failure of the
Amchem and Ortiz class action settlements and the failure of Congress to
act on a general level, bankruptcy may well be the only option available to
defendants seeking peace in an intractable litigation.").
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paradox is not an answer; even in a system that promotes
pragmatic solutions, the conflict that gave rise to the
paradox must ultimately be addressed if the law is to serve
its intended purpose.
A solution to the problem, however difficult, requires an
assessment of the conflict between asbestos veto demands
and the other requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, on the
one hand, and the assumptions underlying the existence and
control of the asbestos veto, on the other. Thus, this section
begins with a critical analysis of the practical justifications
for the current approach to asbestos bankruptcy cases.
Following this discussion, it addresses the prevailing
approach under the legal framework of Section 524(g). As
this inquiry unfolds, the paradox reveals its origins are less
in bankruptcy law than in the accepted norms of legal
practice. This section concludes with a summary of the
consequences of the current approach to asbestos
bankruptcies.
A. Practical Justifications for the Asbestos Veto
As noted previously, an important goal of bankruptcy law
is "to secure a prompt and effectual administration and
settlement of the estate of all bankrupts within a limited
period."122  To advance this goal, the Code substantially
modified the design of its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, to not only encourage timely bankruptcy filings but
also encourage consensus-building among parties in
interest.23 Accordingly, consensual Chapter 11 plans evolve
through negotiation among parties with diverse and
122 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328-29 (1966) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
123 In re Polytherm Indus., Inc., 33 B.R. 823, 835 (W.D. Wis. 1983)
("The authors of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 sought both to
simplify the procedures for reorganizing a debtor by lessening the court's
role in arranging a satisfactory reorganization scheme and to facilitate
negotiation and consensus between the debtor and creditors in devising a
reorganization plan.").
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conflicting interests,124 and courts tend to give parties
considerable leeway to design pragmatic solutions to complex
problems. Indeed, the original asbestos bankruptcy cases
are vivid examples of this design in action.
The prospects for a universally-accepted plan are
weakened, however, as the number of parties and the divide
among their respective interests grow. Parties frequently
rationalize their litigation and negotiation stances to the
point of absurdity, 125 so these divisions can be considerable
where the legal merits and priority of one or more large
blocks of claims are contested, critical legal questions are
124 Plevin et al., supra note 25, at 294 ("Bankruptcy, particularly
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, is often seen as a process within which interested
parties hammer out agreements under the rules established by the
Bankruptcy Code, bringing appropriate concerns and legal conflicts to the
court's attention for resolution only as necessary. Consensual resolution is
at the core of modern bankruptcy practice.").
125 Coleman v. Comm'r, 791 F.2d 68, 69 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Some people
believe with great fervor preposterous things that just happen to coincide
with their self-interest.") (Easterbrook, J.). Indeed, the concepts of self-
serving and confirmation bias are well-recognized in the literature. See,
e.g., Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. Bus. L.J.
417, 424 (Winter 2003) ("[Pleople tend to be subject to the confirmation
bias in that they seek out and process information in such a way as to
confirm pre-existing beliefs rather than in a more optimally neutral
manner."); Max H. Bazerman et al., Environmental Degradation:
Exploring the Rift Between Environmentally Benign Attitudes and
Environmentally Destructive Behaviors, in CODES OF CONDUCT:
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 256, 265 (David M. Messick
& Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996) ("When people are personally involved in
a situation, judgments of fairness are likely to be biased in a manner that
benefits themselves."). As Prentice explains:
A growing body of behavioral research indicates that acting
contrary to one's self interest is not a natural or easy thing.
It is not just that people consciously say: "I'm looking out
for me; screw the other guy," although they sometimes do.
Rather, a menu of cognitive biases and limits on rationality
affect how people perceive, process, and remember
information, and, consequently, how they choose among
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unsettled or the parties have a long history of conflict. All of
these barriers are present in asbestos bankruptcies, and the
asbestos veto makes the "prompt and effectual
administration" of these cases unlikely in a free-fall
bankruptcy. Thus, the asbestos pre-pack strategy may be
viewed as an efficient way to overcome these obstacles.
Just as good intentions and the desire to promote
efficiency escalated the asbestos tort crisis,'26 asbestos pre-
packs made the resolution of some asbestos Chapter 11 cases
less efficient and even more perilous for all parties in
interest. The same biases that fuel litigation may help
explain why so many lawyers justify inequitable
distributions that favor themselves and some clients ahead
of others127 and why debtors cling to fundamentally flawed
plan terms in spite of facially clear statutes, rules, and
opinions.
1. Procedural Efficiencies and Claim Filing
a. Basic Efficiency Assumptions
Conceptually, it is easy to reason that reducing the delays
associated with proving claims will make the bankruptcy
process more efficient. The time and expense associated
with litigating individual claims may be overwhelming, so a
process that expedites claim review and payment should, in
theory, preserve considerable financial and judicial
resources.
126 Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts Can Do in the Face of the Never-
Ending Asbestos Crisis, 71 Miss. L.J. 1, 4 (2001).
127 Bazerman, supra note 125, at 266 ("Ambiguity enables individuals
to make self-serving interpretations of the situation and to judge as fair
distributions of resources that favor themselves."); George Loewenstein,
Behavioral Decision Theory and Business Ethics: Skewed Trade-Offs
Between Self and Others, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 214, 221 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel
eds., 1996) ("[Pleople tend to conflate what is personally beneficial with
what is fair or moral.").
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The asbestos pre-pack strategy addresses these issues by
developing and gaining the approval of distribution
procedures prior to any bankruptcy filing. The procedures
are frequently incorporated into a "master settlement
agreement" and establish minimal evidentiary, diagnostic
and other criteria for approval and ultimate payment of
claims. 128  The firms responsible for processing claims are
selected, begin processing, and often complete their analysis
of most or all of the claims that are filed before the
bankruptcy case commences. Late-filed claims or those that
arise after the pre-petition settlement deadline may be
settled individually or processed under similar procedures
(which are also negotiated pre-petition) that will be used by
the asbestos trust established under the plan.
129
As a result, tens of thousands of asbestos personal injury
claims that may take years or decades to resolve in the tort
system or customary bankruptcy claim review procedures
may be swept into a case, approved, and paid in a matter of
months. This approach has obvious appeal to the lawyers
presenting these claims for payment and the courts that
might otherwise find their dockets overwhelmed by
hundreds or thousands of claim objections. Even critics
should agree that this process, if successful, may be
exceptionally prompt and efficient.
b. Waste and Abuse
Reluctance to investigate asbestos claims may be
understandable, but the belief that it is more efficient does
not make it appropriate or, for that matter, necessarily
improve efficiency. Turning a blind eye to questionable
screening, filing and other practices of some among the
plaintiffs' bar has undoubtedly reduced recoveries for
legitimate claimants and further undermined the integrity of
128 Stroumtsos Order, supra note 58, at 11-13.
129 These trusts will generally have similarly weak mechanisms for
weeding out fraudulent or weak claims. Brickman, supra note 29, at 76.
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the tort system.13  Lawsuits are frequently filed with
inadequate or highly questionable medical and exposure
evidence,3 and the sheer volume of claims filed against any
individual defendant often makes meaningful inquiry into
this evidence unlikely.
132
Although the Bankruptcy Code is designed to provide the
debtor and other parties in interest 1 33 with the ability to
ferret out fraud, this potential remains largely unrealized.
Debtors are unlikely to stir the pot against the very
attorneys whose support is necessary to obtain sufficient
votes to confirm any plan,33 and courts rarely allow other
parties in interest to examine and object to asbestos
claims. 131 Moreover, because many asbestos bankruptcy
130 Matthew Mall, Derailing the Gravy Train: A Three-Pronged
Approach to End Fraud in Mass Tort Medical Diagnosing, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2043, 2053 (2007) (abuse of mass screening has led to a dilution of
legitimate asbestosis claims).
131 See Lester Brickman, Disparities Between Asbestosis and Silicosis
Claims Generated by Litigation Screenings and Clinical Studies, 29
CARDOzo L. REV. 513 (2007) (analyzing screening fraud issues in asbestos
and silica cases); Robin Jones, Searching for Solutions to the Problems
Caused by the "Elephantine Mass" of Asbestos Litigation, 14 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 549, 557 (2001) (regulation of the diagnosis of asbestos related
diseases); see also Editorial, Some Asbestos Grace, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8,
2008, at A8.
112 See Robin Jones, supra note 127, at 557.
133 Bankruptcy Code § 502(a) (allowing any party in interest to object
to claims).
1 As one commentator noted, "raising the ire of the tort lawyers may
mean never getting a settlement completed," Shawn Macomber, Million
Dollar Lungs, AM. SPECTATOR, Mar. 2005, at 22, 28. In fact, the
bankruptcy court in Congoleum expressed "serious concerns about the
independence of judgment being exercised when it comes to Messrs. Rice
and Weitz," the two self-styled "Claimants' Representatives" who
coordinated the pre-pack in that case on behalf of the Controlling Firms.
In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 187 n.14 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007).
... See In re Quigley Co., 346 B.R. 647, 653 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
(concluding that requiring submission of sufficient supporting information
"is cumbersome and best postponed for submission to the post-
confirmation trust" and noting the practice of allowing counsel to cast
votes for unsubstantiated claims on "master ballots"); Brickman, supra
settlements are reached and signed before the debtor's
Chapter 11 case commences, the claims are viewed as
present contractual obligations and may not receive the
same scrutiny that they might encounter as contingent,
unverified tort claims. The courts' repeated refusals to allow
meaningful inquiry into the factual and legal bases for the
claims and the attorneys' unsubstantiated assertions of
authority to bring the claims and vote on the claimants'
behalf 6 effectively undermine any realistic prospect for
preventing fraud and abuse.
In addition, by enabling attorneys to elevate their
negotiating position solely on the number of claims they
bring, Section 524(g) further encourages attorneys to file as
many claims as possible. 137 The upside is considerable: an
attorney can obtain a considerable negotiating position and
sizeable fees by simply dumping their asbestos claim
"inventory" on a debtor. The downside is all but nonexistent:
a low risk of having claims thrown out and little to no
prospect of sanctions for filing even grossly fraudulent or, at
best, wholly unsubstantiated claims. 3 '
With the risks of being discovered so dramatically
reduced, attorneys may be encouraged to file unsupported
note 131, at 554 (most bankruptcy courts have denied requests to test
samples of asbestos screening claims).
136 See In re Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 260 F. App'x. 463, 465 (3d Cir.
2008) (denying insurers standing to appeal, thereby upholding order
allowing law firms to file "exemplars" of authority to satisfy Bankruptcy
Rule 2019 and granting access to those documents only after a motion and
hearing).
137 Michelle J. White, Why the Asbestos Genie Won't Stay in the
Bankruptcy Bottle, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1319, 1338-40 (2002) (arguing that
section 524(g) encourages mass filings by plaintiffs' lawyers); see also
Stroumtsos Order, supra note 58, at 11 (noting argument that the
Congoleum pre-pack bankruptcy settlement encouraged the filing of more
claims, many of which would not have survived in the tort system);
Barliant et al., supra note 53, at 461.
138 See Task Force on Contingent Fees of the American Bar
Association's Tort and Trial Insurance Practice Section, Contingent Fees in
Mass Tort Litigation, 42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAc. L.J. 105, 123 (2006)
(courts do very little to punish fraudulent claims in asbestos litigation).
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(or, as some contend, blatantly fraudulent) asbestos claims.139
Experience demonstrates that these incentives may be more
significant than commonly realized-attorneys that may
have filed very few (if any) cases against a company will
often throw a large percentage (if not all) of their "inventory"
of asbestos claims against a company once its bankruptcy is
announced. 40 Of course, some of these claims may be filed
even without additional incentives, but it is equally clear
that the perceived gains in efficiency from the current
approach are, at a minimum, partially offset by the
additional time required to administer more claims.
2. Procedural Efficiencies of Attorney Dominance
a. Basic Efficiencies of Control
Removing obstacles to compromise among known parties
should also improve efficiency both by avoiding litigation
among those parties and discouraging dissent by minor
creditors and tangential parties in interest. In Chapter 11,
building consensus among those with the strongest legal and
financial positions will often be sufficient to bring
recalcitrant creditors in line or, at least, narrow the field of
objecting creditors to those that lack the votes or legal claims
necessary to block confirmation of a reorganization plan.
Even creditors holding the strongest legal and financial
positions will, in most cases, make concessions; bankruptcy
involves risks and uncertainties for all parties, and those
139 See David M. Setter et al., Why We Have to Defend Against
Screened Cases-Now Is the Time For Change, 18-20 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.
Ass. 23 (Nov. 12, 2003) (arguing that asbestos trusts that conduct few
audits or use minimal medical criteria create incentives for unscrupulous
parties to "manufacture claims"); see also John M. Wylie, The $40 Billion
Scam, READER'S DIGEST, January 2007, available at http://www.rd.com/
contentlprintContent.do?contentId=32514.
"' White, supra note 137, at 1330; see also, Francis E. McGovern, The
Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1749-50 (2002)
(detailing the "field of dreams" effect resulting from plaintiffs' lack of
cooperation resulting in large and disparate groups of plaintiffs pooling
resources in order to maximize compensation).
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that refuse to come to the table on important issues may find
the playing field tilted against them as the case proceeds.
Among other reasons, a recalcitrant creditor's claims may
suffer a concerted attack from debtors and other creditors
and courts may be more amenable to embracing these
challenges if the creditor is viewed as an obstacle to
reorganization. Chapter 11 case law is littered with
shattered claims of creditors who overplayed their hands.
Such creditors may lose bargaining power and, ultimately,
significant financial recoveries in the process.
In addition to these practical realities, asbestos pre-packs
present a bankruptcy court with an extremely appealing
starting point: arguably the most difficult issue in an
asbestos case-satisfaction of the super-majority voting
requirement-has already been resolved. Other parties in
the case are cast in the recalcitrant creditor (or party in
interest) role at the outset; they are seen less as
disenfranchised parties with significant individual rights at
stake than as spoilers pursuing their own self-interest. And
once cast in the role of the recalcitrant creditor, parties may
struggle to overcome this perception.
By embracing asbestos pre-packs, warts and all, courts
may reasonably believe that they are fulfilling their mandate
of making the overall process more efficient and cost-
effective. The outcome of litigation in bankruptcy is
frequently less significant in framing the ultimate rights of
the parties than it is in framing the negotiating postures the
parties take going forward. Once objecting parties get an
opportunity to make their case and lose, they may be less
likely to continue their litigious posture. If those parties
obtain even small victories, on the other hand, they may be
encouraged to forgo settlement in the belief that they can
improve their bargaining positions further. Given the
historical practices of some that may attempt to use
litigation to harass and delay confirmation, this is no small
concern.
Looking beyond the influence on litigation strategy,
asbestos pre-packs promise considerable additional
efficiencies. Many of the up-front costs of administration-
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including the need to identify asbestos creditors, provide
notice, design and manage the voting process, and evaluate
claims-are largely accomplished by private parties in
asbestos pre-packs. The difficult tasks of translating critical
events in a case to those unfamiliar with the complexities of
bankruptcy may also be handled by attorneys. In short,
those presumably hired by asbestos claimants to represent
them, and governed by clear rules of professional conduct,
will do precisely what they are hired to do. And in the
absence of evidence of impropriety in how that job is done,
judicial second-guessing may serve only to delay a facially
acceptable compromise and undermine the potential
efficiencies of the asbestos pre-pack.
b. Practical Incentives and Lost Efficiencies
On the other hand, as recent cases suggest, the financial
incentives associated with Section 524(g) may not only lead
to a flood of new claims but also encourage plaintiffs'
attorneys and other parties, such as insurers, to engage in
extensive litigation. The small circle of plaintiffs' lawyers
that control asbestos litigation have not been reluctant to
fully exploit their presumed veto power, and traditional
factors that may counter a "my-way-or-the-highway"
mentality are either not present in bankruptcy or collapse
due to considerations external to any individual bankruptcy
case. Indeed, even after a plan is rejected, these lawyers
may be more willing to see the debtor liquidate than accept
the changes necessary to make the plan confirmable.4 On
the other side of the aisle, insurance companies faced with
the global prospect of attorney-dominated asbestos
141 For example, following the Third Circuit's rejection of Claimants
Counsels' self-dealing and manipulation of the bankruptcy process, one of
the Claimants Counsel dismissed the ruling and blamed the company's
insurers for the failure of the plan and, in his view, the likely liquidation
of this "mom-and-pop company." Margaret G. Tebo, Philadelphia Fee-
dom, 93 A.B.A. J. 1, 21-22 (2007) ("The insurance companies have been
successful in preventing Congoleum from reorganizing and saving this
little mom-and-pop company. [Congoleum] will probably now go into
liquidation .... ") (quoting Joseph Rice).
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bankruptcies manufacturing potentially unlimited liability
have strong incentives to contest even those cases where
their financial exposure may not be significant.142
By leaving the parties to their own devices, and placing
few substantive boundaries on their conduct or the resulting
plans,14 3 many (though, to be certain, not all) bankruptcy
courts have unwittingly created the conditions necessary for
the asbestos bankruptcy paradox. In authorizing even the
parties' most outlandish attempts to advance their own self
interest, courts have fueled additional litigation both within
the cases before them and, by providing a measure of judicial
approval to these schemes, in similar pending and future
cases. Every decision-even those that are not reported or,
for that matter, reduced to a written order-is introduced in
these other cases across the country and becomes a stepping
stone for ever more aggressive practices. Indeed, most of the
problems identified in ACandS and Combustion Engineering
became widespread long before those bankruptcies were
filed. To that end, these cases are remarkable less for their
legal conclusions than the fact that such fundamental
violations of bankruptcy law became so engrained in the
process before they were ultimately rejected.
Moreover, as the Fuller-Austin debacle demonstrates,
even facially benign court orders can fundamentally alter the
parties' conduct. First, the bankruptcy and the trial courts
treated the underlying problems with the global
arrangement more as judicial "hot potatoes" than as issues
demanding resolution. The bankruptcy and district courts'
acceptance of the Fuller-Austin plan placed the California
trial court in an impossible position-a ruling in favor of the
142 See Davidson, supra note 68, at 95-96 (noting insurers and
defendants have incentives to gamble on risky litigation as they approach
insurance policy limits and insolvency).
" Brickman, supra note 60, at 865 (noting that bankruptcy courts,
"with rare exception, accept, adopt and otherwise ratify whatever is
needed to satisfy plaintiff lawyer demands, which typically include
adoption of trust structures and trust distribution procedures that allow
claims to be paid even if they lack valid evidence of actual injury and proof
of actual exposure to the debtor's products").
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insurers could dramatically reduce possible recoveries for
victims and effectively undermine a plan already approved in
federal court, whereas a ruling against the insurers required
turning a blind eye to the obvious legal and equitable
problems that plagued the arrangement. The trial court's
approach, albeit subtle, shifted responsibility for any obvious
problems back to the bankruptcy court.
The practical impact of Fuller-Austin should not be
overlooked. In the four years between the trial court's order
in favor of the trust and its reversal on appeal, much of the
damage had already been done-plan proponents relied on
the Fuller-Austin cases during this time to rationalize away
the risks that insurers might undermine their plans and, in
the absence of other significant obstacles, dominate
negotiations. Given the global dimensions of asbestos
bankruptcy, however, the hope that other parties would
simply yield across the board was, at best, unrealistic. Thus,
by avoiding critical, albeit difficult, questions, the
bankruptcy, district, and state trial courts unwittingly
created a far more litigious environment in asbestos




144 Plevin et al., supra note 65, at 889 ("[P]arties in interest who were
not included in the pre-petition plan negotiations, and whose interests are
therefore not reflected in the proposed plan, may delay or derail
confirmation by objecting to the plan, thereby depriving the debtor of some
or all of the anticipated benefits of the pre-pack."). This, in fact, is
precisely what happened in recent asbestos pre-packs:
Companies facing tens of thousands of asbestos claims may
view pre-pack bankruptcies as a panacea, in that they
seem to provide a mechanism for quick and inexpensive
relief from the asbestos litigation nightmare. However,
experience has shown that this is not the case because such
bankruptcies have drawn vigorous objections by persons
claiming that pre-packaged asbestos bankruptcies, as
currently practiced, violate the Bankruptcy Code and
Rules, improperly treat some claimants more favorably
than others, and disregard the contractual rights of the
insurers expected to fund the payments under the plan.
Id. at 923.
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B. Section 524(g) in Context
Practical rationalizations aside, courts that have
approved asbestos pre-packs in recent years have relied on
fundamentally flawed statutory interpretations that, much
like those offered by the plan proponents in ACandS,
Combustion Engineering, and Congoleum, elevate form over
substance. The increasing predominance of this mentality in
asbestos bankruptcies corresponds, not surprisingly, to the
adoption of Section 524(g). Once the trust-injunction process
was codified, the emphasis of the parties shifted from its
underlying equitable and constitutional bases to fashioning
colorable interpretations of the statutory language that
maximized their own goals and interests.
The form over substance approach may be superficially
appealing and improve chances for reorganization, but it
rests on the flawed assumption that the singular goal of
Section 524(g) is reorganization. As evidenced by the
legislative history, however, the central goal of Section
524(g) is the protection of future claimants; even the
supplemental injunction against future litigation was
authorized to serve this purpose:
The Committee remains concerned that full
consideration be accorded to the interests of future
claimants who, by definition, do not have their own
voice. Nevertheless, the Committee also recognizes
that the interests of future claimants are ill-served if
Johns-Manville and other asbestos companies are
forced into liquidation and lose their ability to
generate stock value and profits that can be used to
satisfy claims.'45
Thus, this approach mirrors the creditor protection model of
traditional bankruptcies: although creditors sacrifice some
of their individual collection rights under non-bankruptcy
law, creditors as a whole should benefit if the process results
in a greater pool of assets available for distribution and those
. H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 40-41 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340.
[Vol. 2008
No. 3:841] VOTING RIGHTS AND THE ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY PARADOX 897
assets are distributed to creditors equitably according to the
nature of their claims.
The emphasis on protecting future victims permeates the
terms and structure of Section 524(g). Some protections,
such as the requirement that the court appoint a legal
representative, are readily apparent even if viewed in
isolation. This requirement, however, is not the sole
protection for future claimants:
The concept of a legal representative is embedded in
§ 524(g) as part of a framework for dealing with
massive asbestos liabilities in bankruptcy .... The
statutory prerequisites are specifically tailored to
protect the due process rights of future claimants.
The appointment of a legal representative is only one
of the many procedural safeguards that protect
future claimants, who will be bound by terms of the
channeling injunction. 146
Other elements of Section 524(g), such as the obligation to
ensure that current and future claims will receive
substantially similar treatment and super-majority voting
condition serve this purpose only if viewed collectively:
futures are protected where they share a substantial identity
of interest with current claimants and the current claimants
overwhelmingly support the plan. The two primary
alternative due process protections for future claimants-the
appointment of a legal representative and the super-majority
vote/substantially similar treatment requirements-are
discussed in turn.
1. The Perversion of the Legal Representative
Requirement
Although Section 524(g) conditions the application of a
channeling injunction against future claimants on the
"' In re G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Bennet, Jr. et al., 328 B.R. 691, 696-97
(D.N.J. 2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Indeed, legal
representatives lack sufficient bargaining leverage to adequately protect
future victims' interests against overreaching by Controlling Firms. See
Nagareda, supra note 26, at 175-76 & 182.
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appointment of "a legal representative for the purpose of
protecting the rights of persons that might subsequently
assert demands of such kind,"147 the Code does not provide
any direct guidance on the criteria for making such an
appointment. 4 Courts that have considered the question
have focused more on how their different options may delay
confirmation149 than which of these options will best protect
future claimants.5 0 To that end, although the statute and
147 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i).
148 Boe W. Martin, Solution Or Setback For Mass-Tort Bankruptcies?,
COM. LENDING LITIG. NEWS, vol. 7, no. 19 (Mar. 24, 1995) ("In short,
Congress acknowledged the need for a legal representative in the [524(g)]
injunctive process; however, it failed to give the courts any guidance as to
such legal representative's capacity, duties, powers, qualifications, or
compensation.").
149 Tung, supra note 24, at 65.
With the power to decide whether and whom to appoint,
the judge will wish to select a "safe" FCR, one who
subscribes to the common goal of reorganization. The FCR,
the judge, and other parties in interest will understand
this role for the FCR, and their respective expectations of
the FCR's conduct will be affected accordingly. The FCR's
latitude to champion future claimants' cause may be
circumscribed. She is not negotiating on a clean slate, as
she would be if her appointment did not depend on this
collective precommitment to reorganization.
Id.
160 Id. at 64 ("As an institution for the representation and protection of
future claimants, the FCR device is underinclusive. Its use suggests not so
much a concern for otherwise unrepresented claimants, but instead a need
to provide due process cover in order to bind future claimants to a
reorganization plan."). The Supreme Court long ago recognized similar
concerns in the class action context:
Such a selection of representatives for purposes of
litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily
or even probably the same as those whom they are deemed
to represent, does not afford that protection to absent
parties which due process requires. The doctrine of
representation of absent parties in a class suit has not
hitherto been thought to go so far. Apart from the
opportunities it would afford for fraudulent and collusive
sacrifice of the rights of absent parties, we think that the
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legislative history appear to contemplate the selection of an
independent representative selected by the court,151 the
prevailing practice in recent years has been for courts to
appoint the representative that is hand-picked by counsel for
current claimants and the debtor' 52-- the very parties who
stand to lose the most if a strong, independent
representative is appointed.'53
After an appointment is made, judicial attention to the
adequacy of futures representation rarely receives more than
a passing reference, and bankruptcy plans routinely shield
legal representatives from liability to future claimants for all
but the most egregious misconduct. Some legal
representatives have been paid jaw-dropping fees,' and the
representation in this case no more satisfies the
requirements of due process than a trial by a judicial
officer who is in such situation that he may have an
interest in the outcome of litigation in conflict with that of
the litigants.
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (internal citations omitted).
151 See Plevin et al., supra note 25, at 273 ("Congress plainly
envisioned an FCR who was independent of the other parties in the
bankruptcy, aggressively representing future claimants' interests,
standing as a bulwark against abuse of those absent parties.").
12 See id. at 301-14 ("In almost every asbestos bankruptcy case to
date, the bankruptcy court has granted the debtor a presumptive right to
select the FCR, often approving the appointment of an FCR who has
already been selected by the debtor and pre-determined to be acceptable to
the current claimants.").
" McGovern, supra note 48, at 248 ("The selection of the futures
representative is problematic because having a weak futures
representative is in the interests of both the debtor and the current
claimants."); accord In re Kensington Int'l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 304 (3d Cir.
2004) (acknowledging conflict between present and future asbestos
claimants and need for separate representation).
" Brickman, supra note 60, at 868 n.144 (extraordinary Halliburton
fees); see also, In re Mid-Valley, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1553 at 21 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 2004); Russel Gold, Halliburton Finalizes Settlement for $5.1
Billion Over Asbestos, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2005, at A3; Halliburton
Asbestos Settlement Wins Approval, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 30 2004, at C4;
Judge Rules Insurers Have No Standing In Halliburton Units' Bankruptcy
Petition, BESTWIRE (Feb. 11, 2004) (noting that Halliburton's pre-petition
futures representative was paid $9,000 per day-nearly $5 million in all-
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resulting plans often expressly provide for the continued
employment of the legal representative post-confirmation. 55
Under these plans, the legal representatives will report to
the very attorneys that both controlled their appointment
and, in theory, were their adversaries in the bankruptcy
process. Moreover, much like the attorneys that control
their appointment, legal representatives are repeat
performers in asbestos bankruptcies.'56 Thus, in addition to
case-specific incentives, legal representatives for future
victims have strong global incentives against taking
positions in any one case that may alienate these same
attorneys. 1
57
It is difficult to imagine any principal knowingly
employing an agent with such extensive dependence on its
adversaries; of course, future claimants are principals that
do not have the ability to make this choice. As Professor
Tung explained:
[S]evere agency problems exist with the FCR
mechanism [i.e., the appointment of a legal
representative to protect future claimants]. The
fundamental and unavoidable problem is that the
purported principals play no part in choosing or
monitoring their agent or even in deciding whether to
retain one at all. Instead, other parties in interest-
the debtor and other creditors-initiate the process,
pre-petition and was promised future work for the asbestos trust for $600
per day).
15 In re Congoleum Corp., No. 03-51524 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 6, 2004).
" See Nagareda, supra note 26, at 177-79 (discussing the repeat
player problem in the appointment of legal representatives); Jonathan D.
Glater, Lawyers Challenged on Asbestos, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005,
available at http: / / query.nytimes.com / gst/fullpage.html?res=9AO3E3DF1
63FF933A15754COA9639C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.
1.7 See Nagareda, supra note 26, at 177 (discussing the "punch-
pulling" incentive for legal representatives who wish to be "repeat
players"); Plevin et al., supra note 25, at 292-93 ("Further compromising
the pseudo FCR's independence, prospective debtors have tended to choose
the pseudo FCRs from a small stable of repeat FCRs. Such persons are
most likely to be chosen repeatedly if they are viewed by prospective
debtors and claimants as reliable negotiating partners who can be counted
on to not 'rock the boat.'").
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and the judge decides whether and whom to appoint,
as well as the terms of the agency. All these actors
have interests that will conflict with those of future
claimants.
Ultimately, the FCR mechanism may not assure
zealous representation of future claimants' interests.
The FCR has principals only as a conceptual matter.
The terms and quality of the FCR's representation
are not subject to oversight by her ostensible
"clients." A significant potential exists, therefore, for
divergence between the respective interests of
principal and agent.5 '
The net result is that a process designed to protect future
claimants against overreaching by current parties serves the
opposite purpose: protecting deals expressly designed to
prefer current parties from subsequent challenges by future
claimants.
Such an approach is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Taylor v. Sturgell. In that case,
the Court stated the following:
"[I]n certain limited circumstances," a nonparty may
be bound by a judgment because she was "adequately
represented by someone with the same interests who
[wa]s a party" to the suit. Representative suits with
preclusive effect on nonparties include properly
conducted class actions, and suits brought by
trustees, guardians, and other fiduciaries.'59
Although Taylor did not involve "other fiduciaries" like the
Section 524(g) legal representative, the unanimous Court
recognized that the mere presence of a "representative" is
not sufficient; a nonparty is "adequately represented" only if
"the interests of the nonparty and her representative are
aligned.... ."16 And given the Taylor Court's insistence on a
158 Tung, supra note 24, at 60.
159 Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 2172-73 (2008) (internal
citations omitted).
160 Id. at 2176 ("A party's representation of a nonparty is 'adequate' for
preclusion purposes only if, at a minimum: (1) the interests of the
nonparty and her representative are aligned, and (2) either the party
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"constrained approach to nonparty preclusion" '161  and
insistence on "crisp rules with sharp comers,"162 the
suggestion that the appointment of a conflicted Section
524(g) legal representative will pass constitutional muster
strains credulity.
2. The Asbestos Veto Reconsidered
a. The Super-Majority Vote in Context
The place to begin any statutory inquiry is the text of the
statute.63 Unfortunately, Section 524(g) is not always a
model of clarity, and its legislative history is sparse.'
Nonetheless, it is possible to understand the purpose of the
super-majority vote requirement by viewing its role in
Section 524(g)(2)(B)(ii) and by reference to the overall goals
of Section 524(g) generally.
6 5
As noted previously, Section 524(g)(2)(B)(ii) conditions the
issuance of the channeling injunction on a series of court
determinations, including the determination that 75% of
asbestos creditors approve the plan. 66  The first three
understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity or the original
court took care to protect the interests of the nonparty.") (internal
citations omitted).
161 Id. at 2176.
162 Id. at 2177 (quoting Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 123 F.3d
877, 881 (6th Cir. 1997)).
"6 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("It is
elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be
sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain...
the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.").
16 See In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 176 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007).
Of course, as noted previously, even this sparse history clearly establishes
the focus of Section 524(g) is to protect future claimants.
165 See id. (looking to the "overall purpose of § 524(g)" to interpret the
statute).
1 Section 524(g)(2)(B)(ii) requires that the court determine if:
(I) the debtor is likely to be subject to substantial future
demands for payment arising out of the same or similar
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components of this section focus on the threat to equal
treatment posed by current and future claims-substantial
future demands must be likely, it must be difficult to predict
the scope of these future demands, and the pursuit of these
demands will likely undermine the prospects for equitable
treatment of current claims and future demands if the trust-
injunction approach is not used. Given that these concerns
must already be present, reading the fourth component-the
super-majority voting requirement-in a way that would
serve only to increase the disparity among current claims
and future demands seems, at best, out of place. In light of
the long-acknowledged competition between current and
conduct or events that gave rise to the claims that are
addressed by the injunction;
(II) the actual amounts, numbers, and timing of such
future demands cannot be determined;
(III) pursuit of such demands outside the procedures
prescribed by such plan is likely to threaten the plan's
purpose to deal equitably with claims and future demands;
(IV) as part of the process of seeking confirmation of such
plan-
(aa) the terms of the injunction proposed to be issued
under paragraph (1)(A), including any provisions
barring actions against third parties pursuant to
paragraph (4)(A), are set out in such plan and in any
disclosure statement supporting the plan; and
(bb) a separate class or classes of the claimants whose
claims are to be addressed by a trust described in
clause (i) is established and votes, by at least 75
percent of those voting, in favor of the plan; and
(V) subject to subsection (h), pursuant to court orders or
otherwise, the trust will operate through mechanisms such
as structured, periodic, or supplemental payments, pro
rata distributions, matrices, or periodic review of estimates
of the numbers and values of present claims and future
demands, or other comparable mechanisms, that provide
reasonable assurance that the trust will value, and be in a
financial position to pay, present claims and future
demands that involve similar claims in substantially the
same manner.
future claimants for estate assets,167 and the fact that
current claimants already enjoy significant protections under
the traditional voting procedures in Chapter 11, the
conclusion that the super-majority voting requirement was
intended for the singular benefit of current claimants is
untenable.
A contextual analysis not only demonstrates what
interests the super-majority vote is not intended to advance,
it also provides insight into the important function it is
designed to serve-like the rest of Section 524(g), the super-
majority vote exists to protect future claimants. The fifth
component of Section 524(g)(2)(B)(ii) requires a plan to be
designed so that similar current claims and future demands
receive valuations and payments that are the same
considerably or to a large degree, 6 ' or without material
167 As the Supreme Court vividly recognized in a class action case
that, other than the nominal legal foundation, bears remarkable
resemblance to asbestos pre-packs: "Most saliently, for the currently
injured, the critical goal is generous immediate payments. That goal tugs
against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs in ensuring an ample,
inflation-protected fund for the future." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997). The Court subsequently noted the same concern
when it rejected a comparable settlement framed as a "limited fund" class
action in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999). Indeed, the
Second Circuit rejected one claimant's efforts to speak on behalf of
Manville's future claimants in that case due to similar concerns:
Kane's interest in these proceedings is potentially opposed
to that of the future claimants. Both Kane and the future
claimants wish to recover from the debtor for personal
injuries. To the extent that Kane is successful in obtaining
more of the debtor's assets to satisfy his own claims, less
will be available for other parties, with the distinct risk
that the future claimants will suffer. Thus, we cannot
depend on Kane sincerely to advance the interests of the
future claimants.
Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 644 (2d Cir. 1988).
1" Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002)
("'[Slubstantially' in the phrase 'substantially limits' suggests
'considerable' or 'to a large degree.'" (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280 (1976); see also 17 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 66-67 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "substantial" as "relating to or
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qualification.16 9 If their interests are so aligned, providing
current claimants with all relevant information and
requiring their overwhelming approval mirrors a long-
recognized substitute form of due process in situations where
notice and an opportunity to appear are not possible.17 As
one court explained:
Where the identities of the actual takers of a future
interest are unascertainable or otherwise difficult to
determine with certainty, joinder of the presumptive
takers of that interest as of the time of the
commencement of the action will, in appropriate
circumstances, be sufficient to enable any judgment
entered therein to be binding upon all persons,
whether in being or not, in the class of potential
takers of that interest. While the members of that
class may not be individually ascertainable at the
time of the action, they are identifiable as a class and
their interests as such cognizable. The presumptive
takers are persons who would be the actual takers of
the future interest if the contingency occurred at the
time of the commencement of the proceeding
affecting the property in which the future interest
exists. They are permitted to represent the entire
class of potential takers, but only in the absence of
any demonstrable conflict of interest or other
hostility between the presumptive takers and the
other members of the class sought to be
represented .... Utilization of virtual representation
enables the court to act upon the interests of
proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential;" and "of ample or
considerable amount, quantity, or dimensions")).
169 Heublein, Inc. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1455, 1465 (2d Cir. 1993)
("'Substantially' is defined as 'without material qualification;' and as 'in a
substantial manner."') (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1428-29 (6th ed.
1990)).
170 In re Estate of Lange, 383 A.2d 1130, 1140 (N.J. 1978) ("The
assumption underlying the doctrine of virtual representation is the
existence of a relationship between the presumptive takers and the class
of potential takers sufficiently close to guarantee an identity of interest
between the representatives and the class and thus to assure that the
representation will be adequate.").
unascertainable contingent remaindermen to the
same effect as if they all had been sui juris and
parties to the action without any infringement of
their right to due process.'71
Indeed, in its recent rejection of the expansion of the
nebulous concept of "virtual representation," a unanimous
Supreme Court remarked that this form of preclusion is
available only if "(1) the interests of the nonparty and her
representative are aligned, and (2) either the party
understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity
or the original court took care to protect the interests of the
nonparty."
72
The most significant condition, and the most difficult to
satisfy, is that there be a sufficient identity of interest
shared by a party to the suit and the nonparty whose suit
may be precluded. 73 As we have seen, standing alone, the
legal representative device is ill-suited to provide a
meaningful check on overreaching by current parties,174 so
the alignment of current and future interests may be the
only practical manner in which courts may protect the
interests of future victims.
This condition is not satisfied in the recent wave of
asbestos pre-packs, which are premised on the assumption
that the components of Section 524(g)(2)(B)(ii) operate in
171 Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
172 Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 2176 (2008) (internal citations
omitted).
' Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Celotex Corp., 56 F.3d 343, 346
(2d Cir. 1995) ("The question thus is whether NYPBC had an interest in
pursuing a property damage claim against the asbestos manufacturers
sufficiently similar to Chase's interest in pursuing the same claim as to
have created virtual representation. Absent such an identity of incentives,
the application of claim preclusion against Chase would violate concepts of
elemental justice and probably due process."); Delta Air Lines v. McCoy
Rest., 708 F.2d 582, 587 (11th Cir. 1983) ("This principle applies, however,
only when the respective interests are closely aligned and the party to the
prior litigation adequately represented those interests.").
174 See discussion supra Section II.B. 1. Indeed, some have argued that
the legal representative device is fundamentally incapable of protecting
the interests of future claimants. See also discussion infra III.B.
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isolation. By ignoring their context, as well as their purpose,
lawyers claim a power that fundamentally alters the
collective compromise model of Chapter 11. As a result,
rather than maximizing the identity of interest between
current and futures-the focus of Section
524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V)-and protecting the interests of future
claimants-the key aim of Section 524(g)-asbestos pre-
packs ensure that current claimants will obtain far more
than future claimants and therefore have considerably
different interests under the plan. To that end, a critical
element of the substitute due process design has not only
been lost; it has been corrupted to the detriment of the very
parties it was constitutionally required to serve.
b. Attorney Block Voting
Following the lead of ACandS and Combustion
Engineering, some courts have taken a hard line on asbestos
pre-packs that insist on elevating preferred current claims
above similar current and future claims.175  This is a
promising step, but, standing alone, it is insufficient. The
underlying problem with asbestos pre-packs remains: not
only are current claimants' interests far removed from their
future counterparts, they do not, by and large, make the
critical voting decisions:
The near unbridled power of Controlling Firms is further
compounded by the virtually unregulated voting process.
Plaintiff lawyers claiming appointment as attorney-in-fact
for their asbestos clients, deliver their votes in a block-
listing the names of those they claim to represent and the
total vote for and against. While there is, in theory, a
limitation on who is eligible to vote on approval of a Section
524(g) trust, in practice, there are no controls over who gets
... In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 182 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007)
(concluding that such an approach would render a plan "unconfirmable on
its face"). Moreover, Judge Ferguson recently reiterated that "it is not
enough to have mere technical compliance with the trust funding
requirements" of Section 524(g); the plan proponents must establish that
the plan is fair and equitable and proposed in good faith. In re Congoleum
Corp., 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2375, at *32 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2008).
to vote. The absence of any auditing process to confirm that
the claimants have exposure to the debtor's product, that
counsel represents them, that counsel has authority to cast
their ballots, and even that the listed claimants actually
exist, is indicative of the control that plaintiff lawyers
exercise over asbestos bankruptcy proceedings.
17 6
As a result, it is not even possible to characterize modern
asbestos bankruptcy class voting as representative of their
own views, much less of future claimants. As Judge
Weinstein observed:
A second factor inhibiting the courts [sic] inclination
to obtain a vote is the practice of permitting
attorneys to vote on behalf of their clients. This does
not seem appropriate in the context of asbestos
litigation, particularly with respect to the Trust. The
fee and solicitation positions of attorneys in this
specialized and concentrated litigation amount to
vested interests quite distinct in some circumstances
from those of injured claimants. Moreover, conflicts
among the masses of clients each major attorney
represents arise because of vast differences in
exposures, kinds of diseases, ages and needs of
clients and the like. Any position taken by an
attorney is bound to place him or her or one of the
clients at a relative disadvantage or advantage. This
has been true for the last decade in asbestos
litigation.
Treating this mass litigation as if each claimant had
an individual voice and an individual attorney
devoted only to that client's interest is, in the case of
most claimants, a romantic notion based on dreams
of the law's past, having no relationship to the reality
of asbestos lawyering as a business in the present.
177
17' Brickman, supra note 60, at 866-67. This mirrors the attorney-
client dynamic outside of bankruptcy. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Class
Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L REV. 1343,
1346 (1995) (recognizing that "individual plaintiffs have weak to
nonexistent control over their attorneys across the mass tort context").
177 In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 838
(E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1991); accord In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167,
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To that end, regardless of the practical considerations
that make attorney block voting on behalf of current
claimants appealing, it does not provide a sufficient basis for
denying future claimants their day in court.
Beyond due process concerns, block voting presents
immediate practical barriers to satisfying the basic
requirements of bankruptcy law. Attorneys may threaten to
veto confirmation in order to preserve sweetheart deals or to
deter current and future debtors from auditing claims.
Thus, even if a claim audit is wildly successful in rooting out
fraudulent claims, a Controlling Firm may prevent the
debtor from obtaining the benefit of Section 524(g) by casting
its remaining votes against the plan. Of course, a negative
vote may be against the voting clients' best interests in the
case, but, as the circumstances surrounding Congoleum's
sixth amended plan demonstrate, that is hardly a guarantee
that the vote will reflect the clients' immediate interests.178
3. The Limits of Compromise and Section 524(g)
As with any other provision of the Code, the courts'
authority to enjoin actions under Section 524(g) is limited.
In Combustion Engineering, for example, the injunction
protected some of the debtors' non-debtor affiliates, who
might otherwise be sued due to their own distinct asbestos
manufacturing histories, in exchange for their shared parent
company's contributions to the trust.'79 The Third Circuit,
however, properly recognized that bankruptcy jurisdiction
does not extend to a plaintiffs independent cause of action
against any of the non-debtor affiliates. 180 Thus, the court
concluded:
194 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) ("Moreover, many of the claimant's
representatives are using master ballots. The conclusion that claimants
who did not submit an individual ballot gave their unambiguous consent
to this release [in the proposed plan] hangs at the end of a shaky limb.").
171 See discussion supra Section I.D.2.f.
179 In re Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 228 (3d Cir. 2004).
180 Id.
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Although [the parent corporation's] contributions to
the Asbestos PI Trust may depend on freeing [the
non-debtor affiliates] of asbestos liability, and these
contributions may inure to the benefit of certain
Combustion Engineering asbestos claimants, these
factors alone do not provide a sufficient basis for
exercising subject matter jurisdiction. If that were
true, a debtor could create subject matter jurisdiction
over any non-debtor third-party by structuring a plan
in such a way that it depended upon third-party
contributions. As we have made clear, "subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of
the parties. Where a court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over a dispute, the parties cannot create
it by agreement even in a plan of reorganization."
Although federal bankruptcy jurisdiction is
"deliberately expansive" and "conspicuous for its
breadth," it is not without limitation. As such, the
boundaries of bankruptcy jurisdiction cannot be
extended simply to facilitate a particular plan of
reorganization, even if we perceive the plan to be in
the public interest.'
In February 2008, the Second Circuit reached a similar
conclusion concerning the scope of the channeling injunction
issued in the Manville case more than two decades earlier.
1 82
This injunction enjoined "'all persons' from commencing any
action against any of the Settling Insurance Companies 'for
the purpose of, directly or indirectly, collecting, recovering or
receiving payment of, on or with respect to any Claim ... or
Other Asbestos Obligation ... ""'18I In the intervening years,
asbestos plaintiffs sued some of these insurers under various
state insurance regulations and common law tort theories
that centered on, among other things, their role in assisting
Manville and others in concealing the dangers of asbestos. 4
The district court noted that, in spite of the broad language
181 Id. at 228-29 (internal citations omitted).
182 Johns-Manville Corp. v. Chubb Indem. Ins. Co. (In re Johns-
Manville Corp.), 517 F.3d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 2008).
183 Id.
184 Id. at 57-58.
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of the injunction, "[tihe Bankruptcy court has no jurisdiction
to bar a suit alleging tortious conduct by Travelers on behalf
of a non-Manville insured, conduct that is unrelated to
Manville and not based on any knowledge of asbestos gained
from Manville, and that did not involve Manville asbestos or
asbestos products.""5 With that caveat, however, the court
concluded that the injunction applied. 88 On appeal, the
Second Circuit disagreed:
Plaintiffs seek to recover directly from a debtor's
insurer for the insurer's own independent
wrongdoing. Plaintiffs aim to pursue the assets of
Travelers. They raise no claim against Manville's
insurance coverage. They make no claim against an
asset of the bankruptcy estate, nor do their actions
affect the estate. The bankruptcy court had no
jurisdiction to enjoin the Direct Action claims against
Travelers. 187
In other words, "global finality is only as 'global' as the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction"'8 8 and "[t]he bankruptcy
court's desire to facilitate global finality ... may not be used
as a jurisdictional bootstrap when no jurisdiction otherwise
exists."'8 9
The Second and Third Circuits' recent opinions serve as
stark reminders of the limits of compromise and the courts'
authority in bankruptcy. Debtors and other parties in
interest ignore these limits at their own peril; turning a
blind eye to these problems during bankruptcy may expedite
confirmation, but the inherent flaws in any resulting "final"
order may largely undermine some or all of the expected
benefits of the process years or, as shown in Manville,
decades later. For courts, recognition of these limits and
forcing parties to work within them-regardless of self-
serving claims that any overreaching is necessary to achieve
... Id. at 60 (quoting the district court opinion).
'86 Id. at 59-60.
..7 Id. at 65 (internal citations omitted).
' 8 Id. at 66.
189 Id. at 68.
a confirmable plan' 9°-may thus avoid the far more
complicated task of managing the fallout of such a failure
down the road.9
C. The Costs of Failure
With so much maneuvering around legal and practical
justifications, the fundamental purpose of Section 524(g)
may be overlooked. From the perspective of actual future
claimants, however, these are no legal or constitutional
niceties. In addition to the devastating physical and
personal consequences of the disease, they learn that
whatever modest consolation their day in court might have
provided is now lost due to bankruptcy. In the worst-case
scenario, these victims may face a future where the known
parties' own self-interests were so engrained and unyielding
that the companies responsible for their injuries were
ultimately forced into liquidation, leaving nothing to offset
the financial burdens of their diseases. Of course, this also
has significant consequences for individual communities and
families, just as it does in any other corporate liquidation.
In the best-case scenario under prevailing practices of
recent years, lawyers the future claimants never knew, much
less hired, decided that their injuries were less worthy of
compensation. The legal representative appointed to prevent
disparate treatment had financial or other significant
relationships with these same attorneys and was promised
lucrative employment, paid out of the funds set aside for
190 In Combustion Engineering, for example, the plan proponents
asserted: "[if the channeling injunction does not extend to claims against
[the non-debtor affiliates], there is no plan; it is that simple." In re
Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 228 (3d Cir. 2004). Once this option
was foreclosed by the Third Circuit, however, Combustion Engineering
reformulated its plan, which was confirmed less than one year later.
191 See S. Todd Brown, Non-Pecuniary Interests and the Injudicious
Limits of Appellate Standing in Bankruptcy, 59 BAYLOR L. REV. 569, 615
(2007) (arguing that the failure to ensure that the requirements of Section
524(g) are satisfied "will place a greater burden on judicial resources in
the long term").
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future claimants, upon the approval of the deal.192 Of the
hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars collected from
insurers and other defendants, forty percent or more'93
ultimately found its way into the pockets of these
professionals. As a result, future claimants are paid at a
fraction of the rate fixed in the plan;' a rate that was
already lower than comparable then-current claimants
received. 195
Under either scenario, future claimants lose significant
personal and financial rights; the primary benefits of success
flow to those involved in the bankruptcy case. On the flip
side, rampant claim inflation ensures that those with weak
medical or causal evidence obtain significant windfalls.
Thus, in addition to the depletion of assets by unimpaired
claims, those with strong evidence establishing a causal link
to a particular defendant must compete for a limited pool of
assets against those with weak or non-existent ties to the
defendant.
Cynically speaking, a claimant with strong claims against
a debtor whose asset pool is depleted by weak claims under
this system may have a similarly weak basis for asserting a
claim against a subsequent debtor. If that subsequent
debtor's case also has weak barriers to payment, the
claimant may ultimately make up the difference or even
obtain more recovery in the long run. As a mass tort
1 Brickman, supra note 60, at 878-80.
193 Plaintiffs' counsel contingency fees alone average more than 34%
(and may be considerably higher for an individual claimant), and few
trusts cap the contingency fee rate that may be charged. Id. at 841-42.
This amount is in addition to any side "success fee" demanded by a
Controlling Firm, see note 53, supra, and the annual costs of
administration. See Stephen Carroll et al., Asbestos Litigation 97 (RAND
Inst. for Civil Justice 2005) ("From 1994 to 2000, the Manville Trust
reported annual average operating expenses . . . of about $10 million,
about 5 percent of the total dollars it paid out to asbestos claimants plus
expenses during this period.").
" See Carroll, supra note 193, at 114-15 (noting the history of
asbestos bankruptcy trusts dramatically reducing the percentage paid to
claimants as assets are depleted).
"' See discussion at I.D.l.a, supra.
rationalization that would make Charles Ponzi proud, of
course, it assumes that there will be similar standards in
future bankruptcies and that the individuals making the
decision to file claims will not be limited by the technical fact
that their claims have little or no merit as against those
future debtors.
Ultimately, the development of a system that adequately
compensates all victims of asbestos exposure may, as the
Supreme Court noted, 9 ' rest in the hands of Congress.
However good the intentions, decades of trying to do so
through the tort and bankruptcy systems have undermined
the integrity of both and left too many victims without
recovery.97 Where recovery is obtained, it comes only after
extraordinary delays and at great expense. 9 ' These
problems did not begin with bankruptcy law, but bankruptcy
need not be a way to simply pass financial burdens onto
future victims.
196 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 819 (1999) ("The
elephantine mass of asbestos cases . . . defies customary judicial
administration and calls for national legislation.").
197 As one commentator reasoned:
[B]ecause of a lack of scrutiny with respect to information
utilized to substantiate an individual claimant's claim, in
some cases, the claim is based on questionable pulmonary
function tests and x-ray interpretations. Undoubtedly, the
result has been that numerous claimants who are currently
asymptomatic, or only mildly impaired, have been
overcompensated for their injuries at the expense of
seriously ill claimants, as well as future claimants.
William J. Warfel, Ph.D, Asbestos Litigation Reform: An Identification of
Problematic Issues, CPCU eJOURNAL, Nov. 2004 at 5. This is no mere
hypothesis; as the filing of screening-based claims declined in the
aftermath of Judge Jack's scathing criticism of similar practices in silica
litigation, "[tihe average malignant claim settlement amount rose as
defendants moved away from settling claims in groups, which had
depressed average payments for malignant injuries." Austern &
Bhagavatula, supra note 58, at 75.
198 See James Surowiecki, Asbestos, Inc., NEW YORKER, Mar. 6, 2006,
available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/03/06/060306tatalk
_surowiecki (noting that "roughly sixty per cent of all the money spent on
[asbestos] litigation has gone to attorneys").
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IV. RESTORING THE PURPOSE AND PROMISE OF
ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY LAW
"How wonderful that we have met with a paradox ....
Now we have some hope of making progress."199
In the rush to manufacture consensus, the most notable
compromises in recent asbestos bankruptcies have been to
the integrity and underlying fairness of the system."' Of
course, some may reason that avoiding liquidation is
ultimately better for future claimants, so the flaws in the
process are justified. Such a rationalization, while
practically inadequate for future victims, also assumes that
there are not other viable alternatives and is based on policy
judgments that are inconsistent with practical experience
and the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. The degree to
which participants and courts have been willing to look past
the extreme manner in which the system has been
compromised is based less on indifference than mistaken,
often self-serving rationalizations. As demonstrated, these
rationalizations do not withstand scrutiny.
As long as asbestos litigation continues, some defendants
will ultimately be forced to risk bankruptcy, uncertainties
and all. For these companies, the asbestos veto may not only
discourage a timely filing; it may make it impossible to
obtain a truly final resolution of asbestos liability in
bankruptcy. The ultimate outcomes for these companies and
asbestos victims depend on whether recent developments
serve as a wake-up call and lead to fundamental changes to
the way that asbestos bankruptcies are negotiated, overseen
by courts and structured. Above all, just as attitudes and
negotiating postures have become distorted by failures in the
system, they may be corrected by more aggressive judicial
199 RUTH MOORE, NIELs BOHR: THE MAN, His SCIENCE, & THE WORLD
THEY CHANGED 196 (Alfred A. Knopf 1966) (quoting Niels Bohr speaking at
a colloquium).
200 Barliant et al., supra note 53, at 441 (noting that recent asbestos
bankruptcies "refined the mechanics, and strayed from the purpose, of the
Bankruptcy Code and particularly of section 524(g)").
oversight and structural protections designed not only to
address discrete issues as they arise but also the global
incentives that have, to date, driven asbestos bankruptcy
cases.
Consensual resolution may be the normative priority in
Chapter 11, but this does not justify judicial acceptance of
proposals that compromise the very provisions intended to
protect those who are not at the negotiating table. Parties
are, of course, free to negotiate away their own rights; the
statutory protections of the rights of others, however, are not
theirs'-or the courts'-to compromise. °1  Steadfast
adherence to this fundamental principle should be the norm
in any bankruptcy case, but it has not been the norm in
recent asbestos bankruptcies:
[B]etween Johns-Manville and ACandS are
numerous asbestos cases in which the purpose and
language of the Bankruptcy Code have been
disregarded in favor of expediency. That expediency
is rationalized as necessary to save the debtor
company and compensate asbestos victims. But by
departing from the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code, the engineers of these cases too often
compromise the rights of others, including the
victims of asbestos exposure whose interests are not
represented.0 2
Congoleum and other recent cases, however, illustrate
that plans that rely on compromising the protections of
201 See Local No. 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986) ("Of
course, parties who choose to resolve litigation through settlement may
not dispose of the claims of a third party, and a fortiori may not impose
duties or obligations on a third party, without that party's agreement. A
court's approval of a consent decree between some of the parties therefore
cannot dispose of the valid claims of nonconsenting intervenors; if properly
raised, these claims remain and may be litigated by the intervenor.").
202 Barliant et al., supra note 53, at 442; Boe W. Martin, Solution Or
Setback For Mass-Tort Bankruptcies?, COM. LENDING LITIG. NEWS, April 7,
1995, at 4. ("In short, Congress acknowledged the need for a legal
representative in the [524(g)] injunctive process; however, it failed to give
the courts any guidance as to such legal representative's capacity, duties,
powers, qualifications, or compensation.").
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Section 524(g) are unconfirmable; so it is no longer efficient
or practical for bankruptcy courts to turn a blind eye to these
compromises. In these circumstances, courts, as the only
participants empowered to take decisive action, have an
obligation to the parties before them and the integrity of the
judicial process to do so.
213
To be clear, this assessment of judicial practice in this
area to date is not a condemnation of the judges involved,
their competence, or their willingness to ensure that the rule
of law is followed. Bankruptcy judges must balance a wide
array of competing legal and practical considerations, often
with poor guidance from Congress and other courts, and with
little time to do so. They properly focus on the matters
before them, and decisions that may seem clearly misguided
from a global perspective may be entirely reasonable when
considered in isolation. This is particularly true when those
challenging the courts' wisdom do so with the benefit of
hindsight. However, today we have the benefit of this
hindsight, and the unfolding image that it presents demands
that courts take a much more active, critical role in
overseeing asbestos cases than has been the norm to date. It
is time to revisit the practices that gave rise to the asbestos
paradox and have consistently undermined the goals of
Section 524(g).
203 In re Martin, 817 F.2d 175, 180 (1st Cir. 1987) (recognizing the
"bankruptcy court's fundamental responsibility to monitor the integrity of
the proceedings before it"); In re Narod, 138 B.R. 478, 481-82 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1992) ("It is within the discretion of the bankruptcy court, and indeed
it is the court's obligation, to prevent flagrant abuse of the Bankruptcy
Code.") (emphasis added); MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Panem (In re Panem),
352 B.R. 269, 278 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006) ("The inherent powers of this
Court, embodied in 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), impose a duty on this Court to
ensure that the provisions of the Code are carried out and to prevent an
abuse of process."); In re Bruno, 68 B.R. 101, 103-04 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1986) ("[TIhe bankruptcy court has a paramount obligation to prevent
such abuses as will bring the great goals of bankruptcy into disesteem and
disrepute.").
A. Aligning the Interests of Current and Future
Claimants
Section 524(g), as noted previously, may be read to
require an identity of interest between current and future
claims by demanding "reasonable assurance that the trust
will value, and be in a financial position to pay, present
claims and future demands that involve similar claims in
substantially the same manner." Ensuring that current and
future claimants have an identity of interest sufficient to
satisfy the demands of due process is no simple task, but the
failure to do so will have considerable implications for future
victims. This failure leaves the Controlling Firms with little
incentive to challenge overreaching by their counterparts as
long as the pool of assets available for asbestos claims
(current and future) is sufficient to pay their respective
current claims to their satisfaction. If they must share the
potential burden imposed by over-claiming with future
claimants evenly, however, these disagreements may force
these concerns to the forefront of negotiations. Accordingly,
over-claiming stands a far greater likelihood of being
addressed in a meaningful way before significant trust assets
are wasted to satisfy frivolous or unsupported claims.
Alignment of current and future claims may be achieved
by taking into account reasonable estimates of the long-term
assets and liabilities of the asbestos trust-recognizing the
likelihood that these estimates have historically been higher
and lower, respectively, than they proved to be in practice. If
these adjusted estimates reflect a reasonable prospect of a
long-term shortfall, payment of current claims should be
reduced to the extent necessary to make anticipated current
and future payments for similar claims equal to future
demands. Unpaid amounts may be escrowed for a fixed
period, at least until such time as the anticipated shortfalls
are no longer a concern (which may be established by
evidence that trust assets are demonstrably higher or actual
expenses of the trust are demonstrably lower than
estimated), and then paid at that time. At a minimum, and
in accordance with the conclusions in Combustion
Engineering and other asbestos bankruptcy opinions, a true
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"identity of interest" demands an end to front-loading
payments to current claimants through "stub claims" or
other contrivances.
Critical questions arise, however, about whether current
claims are legitimate proxies for future victims and whether
the individuals casting votes do so in a manner that reflects
the interests of current claimants (and, by proxy, future
victims). These issues are discussed in turn.
1. The Legitimacy of Current Claimants as
Proxies for Future Victims
Throughout the history of bankruptcy law, transparency
has been viewed as an essential element in maintaining
confidence in the system.2"4 Although "[t]here is a strong
presumption and public policy in favor of public access to
court records" generally, "[t]he public interest in openness of
court proceedings is at its zenith when issues concerning the
integrity and transparency of bankruptcy court proceedings
are involved. ,, "0 Of course, transparency is not only a
question of access to public records but also the open
disclosure of critical information in those records. As Judge
Bohm recently noted, "in order for the bankruptcy system to
function... every entity involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding must fully disclose all relevant facts.""' This
204 In re Mt. Highlands, No. 11-06-10011-SA, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS
4268, at *31 (Bankr. D.N.M. Dec. 14, 2007) ("[Tlransparency,
accountability and integrity are the three overarching values of the
bankruptcy process.") (citing Hon. Leif Clark); Dicta: Conflicts of Interest,
21-3 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 37 (2002)); Craig H. Averch, Lien Stripping
Under Russian Bankruptcy Law: Is it Fair?, 105 CoM. L.J. 77, 83 (2000)
(noting "flexibility, transparency, and consistency are key components of
effective bankruptcy laws").
205 In re Food Mgmt. Group, 359 B.R. 543, 553 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007);
see also In re Bell & Beckwith, 44 B.R. 661, 664 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)
('"This policy of open inspection, established in the Bankruptcy Code itself,
is fundamental to the operation of the bankruptcy system and is the best
means of avoiding any suggestion of impropriety that might or could be
raised.").
20 Sanchez v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. (In re Sanchez), 372 B.R. 289,
297 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (citing several cases); see also In re Davis, No.
mirrors the First Circuit's emphasis on full disclosure by
debtors in bankruptcy:
The [bankruptcy] statutes are designed to insure
that complete, truthful, and reliable information is
put forward at the outset of the proceedings, so that
decisions can be made by the parties in interest
based on fact rather than fiction. As we have stated,
the successful functioning of the bankruptcy act
hinges both upon the bankrupt's veracity and his
willingness to make full disclosure. Neither the
trustee nor the creditors should be required to
engage in a laborious tug-of-war to drag the simple
truth into the glare of daylight."7
In short, the integrity of the bankruptcy process demands
transparency-both in disclosure and open public records.
Like so many other provisions of bankruptcy law, Section
524(g) cannot serve its fundamental purpose without
transparency. Votes cast in the names of fraudulent
creditors protect current and future victims no more than
votes cast on account of a random sampling of the phone
book. Without transparency, however, enormous blocks of
fraudulent or fundamentally flawed claims may be filed and
alter critical asbestos creditor voting results.
Even if such claims are entitled to a presumption of
validity notwithstanding the overwhelming historical
evidence of asbestos claim fraud and other questionable
conduct,20 the refusal to allow other parties in interest to
00-73-45-CMS-13, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1514, at *20 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Apr.
25, 2007) ('The protections of the Bankruptcy Code carry with them the
duty of transparency for all parties--debtors; creditors; trustees; and their
attorneys, as officers of the court. Disclosure is the foundation stone for
all."); In re Matus, 303 B.R. 660, 675 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2004) ("The
[bankruptcy] statutes are designed to insure that complete, truthful, and
reliable information is put forward at the outset of the proceedings, so that
decisions can be made by the parties in interest based on fact rather than
fiction.") (quoting Boroff v. Tully (In re Tully), 818 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir.
1987)).
207 In re Tully, 818 F.2d at 110 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
" See, e.g., Brickman et al., supra note 127.
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test this presumption in any meaningful way is inexcusable.
Given this history and the potential prejudice to asbestos
victims, bankruptcy courts should not just allow but require
spot audits of the supporting information for claims either
filed against a debtor or settled pre-petition. 209 Secondary
audits should also be required for firms whose sample claims
fare poorly in an initial audit. And, given that firms have
been remarkably consistent in their practices (if not their
factual assertions) across cases, particularly demanding
scrutiny should be the norm for claims submitted by firms
with a history of filing weak or unsupported claims.
Of course, the primary drawback of transparency is that
investigation will delay the case. Practically speaking, the
delays associated with initial investigations alone are
minimal. The real threat is that widespread fraud or other
misconduct will be discovered, thereby delaying a case for
months or years, if a plan will ever be confirmed. Yet this is
precisely the risk that debtors, lawyers, and other
professionals assume when they play fast and loose with
claims, even when practical experience shows that the risk is
virtually non-existent. By making this risk a reality, courts
may finally start deterring such conduct and bring some
semblance of sanity to the claim filing process.
Moreover, courts and parties are entitled to know who
attorneys represent and the nature of their representation in
bankruptcy. As demonstrated in the Gilbert Heintz
disqualification in Congoleum, there is considerable risk
involved with allowing relationships to remain concealed
over a prolonged period. This is no less true for parties who
assert, but are often unwilling to substantiate, the authority
to speak for large blocks of asbestos claimants. If claimants'
rights are going to be modified by a bankruptcy, it is hardly
unreasonable to ensure that they are aware of the case and
have specifically authorized counsel to speak and vote on
their behalf in that case.
209 Recent developments in the W.R. Grace bankruptcy reveal that
such an approach may effectively root out fraud. See generally, Editorial,
Some Asbestos Grace, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2008, at A8.
Unfortunately, experience demonstrates that courts and
parties may not be able to rely on rules governing
professional conduct to guard against abuse. This was true
in asbestos cases nearly two decades ago,21 0 and it remains
true in bankruptcy today. As an initial matter, the systems
that regulate attorney misconduct are far from adequate.21" '
Clients are rarely able to supervise their attorneys
throughout the litigation and settlement process,212 and
attorneys frequently underestimate their personal risks."3
210 See Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, No. 88-1014-K, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6710, at *5-6 (D. Kan. May 30, 1990) ("For all purposes,
Raymark and this court reasonably assumed, given the defendant
attorneys' professional responsibilities and Rule 11 compliance, that they
would only submit claims of at least some merit, but surely would not
recklessly acquiesce in the filing of a constant, steady flow of faulty claims.
As this opinion will demonstrate, such is apparently the case. As stated at
the time of hearing on the motions, this claim process appears to be a
'professional farce!' The process makes a mockery of the practices of law
and medicine! Indeed, if this court were now to acquiesce in any of them it
would make a laughingstock' of the court!").
211 David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 799, 867 (1992) ("By condemning only the most flagrant departures
from the client service model, the current disciplinary system leaves a
regulatory void that may encourage lawyers for individual clients to
exploit the indeterminacy of legal rules in ways quite inconsistent with
either client or public understandings of professional independence.
Sociologists have repeatedly documented instances in which these lawyers
have sacrificed the interests of their unsophisticated clients to avoid the
powerful embedded controls exerted by colleagues, state officials, or others
with whom they share a long-term relationship. Although it is possible
that these embedded interests will coincide with a lawyer's independent
professional judgment, it is as least at likely that 'lawyers may wield a
power they have over individual clients in a manner that benefits no one
so much as themselves.'") (quoting Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients,
34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 720 (1987)).
212 See Brickman, supra note 60, at 838 ("Even egregious violations of
rules of ethics usually generate disinterest from bar disciplinary counsel
and state supreme courts when the subject is asbestos litigation."); Roger
C. Cramton, Asbestos Litigation & Tort Law: Trends, Ethics, & Solutions,
31 PEPP. L. REV. 175, 178 (2003) ("Individual clients, who could raise the
issues, have neither the time nor the resources to pursue these issues.").
213 Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL
L. REV. 775, 788 (2006) ("The same self-serving bias that colors auditors'
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Indeed, as Professor Regan's recent book.14 concerning the
rise and fall of attorney John Gellene highlights, lawyers are
as susceptible to self-serving justifications as anyone else.
Moreover, because the law firms that submit claims for
payment may have no direct contact with the claimants,
screening companies, or doctors involved, the system
conveniently offers lawyers multiple layers of deniability in
the event that the claims are ultimately found to be wholly
unsupported in fact. Thus, just as some courts appear
content to rely on state bar associations to keep attorneys in
check, attorneys may claim that they relied on these parties'
professional or other obligations rather than investigating
critical elements of the claims themselves.
Bankruptcy courts hold significant options in sanctioning
fraudulent claim filings and other misconduct.215 Much like
the other options discussed previously, however, this
potential remains unrealized. Lawyers who submit
unsupported or fraudulent claims, regardless of their actual
knowledge of any misconduct on the part of other
professionals or claimants, are responsible for the claims
that they submit for payment.216  The courts' general
judgments affects attorneys as well. No attorney believes disbarment or
civil liability for securities fraud is in her long-term interest, but
overconfidence, undue optimism, the illusion of control, and related
decision-making errors can cause attorneys to jeopardize their long-term
reputational interest by taking unwise risks.").
214 MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL
STREET LAWYER (2004).
25 See, e.g., Adair v. Sherman, 230 F.3d 890, 895 n.8 (7th Cir. 2000)
("Rule 9011(b) explicitly requires all filings with the court to present only
facts which the party reasonably believes to have evidentiary support;
debtors facing fraudulent proofs of claim could seek sanctions under that
section."); Caldwell v. United Capital Corp. (In re Rainbow Magazine,
Inc.), 77 F.3d 278, 284-85 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing bankruptcy courts'
inherent power to sanction misconduct).
216 Bankruptcy Rule 9011 requires a "reasonable" inquiry into any
claim submitted for payment in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Timmons v. Cassell
(In re Cassell), 254 B.R. 687, 691 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2000) (noting "a
continuing responsibility to review and reevaluate" the basis for the claim,
thus, the attorney presenting the claim cannot merely rely on others in
fulfilling this duty); Sramek v. Jacobsen (In re REJ Props.), No. 07-41274
unwillingness to investigate is understandable-opponents
may abuse the process, among other reasons-but the firm
application of a standard of conduct in asbestos claim
submissions is a necessary element of deterring misconduct.
As Professor Hylton reasoned in the asbestos tort context:
In light of the apparent incentive to include
fraudulent claims in mass tort settings, a policy of
sanctioning plaintiffs' attorneys who bundle
fraudulent claims would be desirable. The plaintiffs'
attorney should be considered responsible for the
quality of claims he represents. If an attorney is
permitted to avoid responsibility by arguing that he
had no knowledge of the fraudulent claims, then
attorneys who knowingly bundle fraudulent claims
will find no obstacles in their way.
17
The Gellene matter demonstrates the degree to which
even one case can alter legal cultures. Although the conduct
involved and Gellene's ultimate criminal conviction may
have been extreme examples, the courts' strict application of
bankruptcy disclosure requirements forced practitioners and
law firms to reevaluate their bankruptcy disclosure
processes and played a significant role in the adoption of the
"when in doubt, disclose '218 approach at law firms across the
EDJ, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3447, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2007)
("Rule 9011 does not allow counsel to avoid responsibility by claiming that
they relied on another attorney's opinion."). Although many asbestos pre-
packs may arguably allow attorneys to avoid potential Rule 9011 issues by
recognizing claims processed pre-petition, there is no principled reason to
hold attorneys to a lower standard when filing claims against asbestos
trusts.
217 Keith N. Hylton, Asbestos and Mass Torts with Fraudulent Victims,
Sw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1088399.
218 In re LSS Supply, Inc., 247 B.R. 280, 283 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2000)
("The standard is really quite simple, disclose one's connection and, if
there is any doubt what should be disclosed, one must err on the side of
disclosing information and not withholding information."); Michael
Richman, Disclose (Publish) or Perish, Revisited: Disclosing Business
"Connections" between Bankruptcy Counsel and Other Professionals, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., APR. 2006, at 18 (2006) (noting the "cardinal principle
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country. This is not to suggest that the lawyers involved in
asbestos bankruptcies have committed bankruptcy fraud or
need be convicted of criminal misconduct.219 Rather, it
reflects the fact that, in the relatively small world of
corporate bankruptcy practice, uncompromising judicial
responses to clear misconduct and an unyielding policy of
investigating questionable conduct are likely to influence
attitudes toward disclosure. Of course, as the Gilbert Heintz
example demonstrates, some firms may still be willing to
press their luck. When they do, however, courts have an
obligation to the process, and to those who fulfill their own
obligations within that process, to respond with nothing less
than decisive sanctions.
2. Ensuring that Votes Represent the Correct
Interests
The degree to which previous asbestos bankruptcies have
been plagued by attorney conflicts of interest has been the
focus of intense academic discussion recently.220 Moreover,
one of the most significant and least discussed elements of
the Third Circuit's reversal of Gilbert Heintz's retention in
Congoleum was the panel's harsh admonition to lower courts
about their obligation to scrutinize the roles played by
professionals in asbestos bankruptcies:
[I]n class actions, particularly settlement-only suits,
the district court has a duty to protect the members
of the class.. . from lawyers for the class who may,
in derogation of their professional and fiduciary
obligations, place their pecuniary self-interest ahead
of that of the class .... [W]e caution that here, as in
'when in doubt, disclose,'" and the "remarkable... prominent examples of
failures that uniformly provoke the response, 'what were they thinking?'").
219 However, given the current state of play in asbestos pre-packs, it
seems doubtful that even criminal misconduct would be discovered in most
cases.
.2 See, e.g., Brickman, supra note 60.
situations of settlement-only class litigation, careful
and comprehensive scrutiny is required.22'
This focus is not mere professionalism for
professionalism's sake; the courts' failure to scrutinize the
relationships and conflicts of interest that permeate asbestos
bankruptcies strips away significant protections of the
statute and undermines the legitimacy of any plan that may
be confirmed.2 Block voting by conflicted counsel fails to
provide the "indicia of creditor support" that the voting
requirements of Sections 524(g) and 1129 are designed to
obtain. At best, it demonstrates that attorneys, whose
interests may conflict with some or all of the claimants
whose votes they are casting, support the plan.
Conversely, the failure to reign in attorney conflicts may
unreasonably delay, or even completely undermine a case.
As demonstrated in Congoleum, attorneys may cast all of
their clients' votes against a plan based on their
dissatisfaction with the treatment afforded to some claims,
even though that treatment benefits most of their clients.
To be clear, the Controlling Firms and other counsel are
important components of any realistic process for managing
asbestos claims in bankruptcy. Attorneys can play an
invaluable role in facilitating communication to plaintiffs,
and their presence is usually the primary safeguard against
overreaching by other powerful, well-financed parties.
Moreover, managing the complexities of Chapter 11 can be
difficult for even seasoned practitioners, much less
unsophisticated individual creditors. Thus, the advice of
experienced counsel may be necessary for most asbestos
claimants to make anything resembling educated judgments
at key stages of the process.
221 Century Indem. v. Congoleum Corp. (In re Congoleum) 426 F.3d
675, 693-94 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
222 Id. at 692 ("We do not approve of a bankruptcy court applying less
than careful scrutiny to pre-petition procedures in pre-packaged plans.
The parties here seek the court's imprimatur of a reorganization that will
free the debtor of all current and future asbestos liability. The legitimacy
of such a transaction is dependent on the stature of the court.").
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Acknowledging that attorneys have a critical role to play,
however, does not mean that asbestos bankruptcies are
necessarily unworkable. Rather, it suggests that greater
vigilance is required to balance this necessity against its
inherent risks. Clearly defining the parameters of that
involvement will allow courts and other parties to restore
due process for future claimants and, practically speaking,
provide an important check on the asbestos veto power. Two
fundamental approaches to addressing these concerns are
readily apparent: insist upon individual asbestos claimant
voting or adopt procedures that better protect against
conflicts of interest.
Although block voting may provide some administrative
convenience, it also lends itself to self-dealing and
manipulation by conflicted attorneys. Moreover, there is no
principled reason that asbestos claimants must vote in blocks
through their attorneys. Many asbestos bankruptcies
already involve claim and noticing agents who specialize in
handling mass claimant issues in bankruptcy, and large
bankruptcy cases frequently involve large blocks of creditors
who vote individually. In short, given the experience and
technological sophistication of these organizations, 223 it is
both practical and reasonable to require individual voting in
asbestos bankruptcy cases.
Even where claimants expressly allow their attorneys to
vote on their behalf, this consent will not be sufficient if it is
not informed. The fact that many of these clients may not be
sophisticated does not mean that they are incapable of
understanding the basic issues that concern them most, and
straightforward disclosure of the factors that may influence
those casting their votes will at least give them the
opportunity to make informed decisions. If a claimant
continues to agree that the attorney may vote their claim
after full, current disclosure, and that vote does not
otherwise violate professional responsibility obligations, then
the vote may be sufficient.
223 See Laura DiBiase, Technology as a Competitive Advantage for
Today's Legal Processes, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2006, at 48-49.
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Of course, attorneys are subject to state bar
investigations for misconduct, but, for the reasons discussed
previously, the expectation that this risk will provide
adequate assurance that these disclosures will occur is no
substitute for diligent oversight. To that end, mandatory
disclosure of information that will enable claimants to
evaluate these conflicts-among other things the attorney's
other representations, personal interests, and financial
compensation received (or to be received) in connection with
the case-should be required.
3. Ensuring the Alignment of Interests in
Practice
The practical elements of aligning current and future
interests are deceptively simple:
(1)All assets available to pay current and future claims
should be swept into a single fund, not separate trusts;
(2) The same claim criteria should be used to validate and
value current and future claims; and
(3)Current individual claim payments should be capped
at a percentage that, under conservative estimates,
maximizes the likelihood that similar current and future
claims will be paid on a pro rata basis.
In theory, such an arrangement would force current
parties to address the very difficult disputes over the basic
standards of proof required to establish a valid claim, the
relative values of different types of asbestos injuries, and the
aggregate amount of funding available to the trust. In the
two decades since the Manville trust was established, dozens
of similar approaches both in and out of bankruptcy have
been established, so we have tremendous empirical resources
available to guide the estimation of how different criteria
will affect the aggregate payments under a trust over its
lifetime and gauge the total assets that we may expect to be
available to a trust during this time. And, as time goes on
and additional information becomes available, these
estimates should improve.
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In practice, however, these guidelines may be difficult to
administer. The estimation of future liabilities and assets is
extremely complex and subject to manipulation. Even good
faith estimates may not account for critical, as yet unknown,
scientific and legal developments that may fundamentally
alter the dynamics of the process. Moreover, current
claimants may reject any scheme that withholds a portion of
their recoveries on principle alone. At the very least, this
process may intensify intra-class disputes among asbestos
claimants and delay or undermine plan confirmation.
Although these problems are significant, they are not
unique to this proposal. Recent cases avoid them not by
resolving important questions about the burden of proof
required to establish claims or the relative value of different
types of claims but by allowing each distinct current
claimant group to maximize its own recovery prospects. As
long as sufficient assets are available to pay a current
claimant group however much they believe to be satisfactory,
they have no financial incentive to intervene in the decisions
affecting the treatment of other claims. Those whose claims
will be impacted by those provisions-future victims-do not
have a meaningful voice in the process at the outset and, by
the time they are involved, there may be too little left of the
trust assets to justify a battle over the inequities built into
the trust's administration.
B. Reframing Section 524(g) Legal Representatives'
Role in the Protection of Future Claimants
Professor Nagareda makes a compelling case that Section
524(g) legal representatives lack the necessary bargaining
leverage to be "robust protector[s]" of future claimants'
interests.224  And, as Professor Nagareda suggests, the
emphasis on the appointment of a legal representative to
protect future victims' interests distracts us from pursuing a
far more promising approach-adjusting the incentives for
224 Nagareda, supra note 26, at 182; see generally, id. at 179-82.
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those with considerable leverage in negotiations in a manner
that may better protect future victims.22
Professor Nagareda's well-reasoned assessments,
however, highlight the inadequacies of the Section 524(g)
legal representative when it is the only source of protection
for future victims-as has been the case in recent asbestos
bankruptcies-not its potential utility as part of a larger
system of protection. Statutory legal representatives
undoubtedly have standing to challenge provisions of a plan
that undermine Section 524(g)'s protections, which, in itself,
can be a valuable tool in negotiations. Indeed, bankruptcy
courts will be hard-pressed to recommend confirmation of a
plan over a legal representative's well-reasoned objections,
particularly with respect to the critical questions of voting
manipulation, questionable liability estimates, front-loaded
payments, and lowball trust funding arrangements.
To date, however, this potential remains largely
unrealized. To be certain, some legal representatives have
been aggressive in matters concerning trust funding, but few
have forced significant alterations to matters that put them
at odds with the Controlling Firms who may veto their
appointment in future cases and deny them lucrative
positions with any asbestos trust established by a plan of
reorganization. Whether this punch-pulling effect is
conscious or not, it suggests that greater vigilance is
required in ensuring that legal representatives' interests are
fully aligned with those of future victims.
1. Selection and Appointment
As in other areas of law, the divide between legal
scholarship concerning Section 524(g) and prevailing practice
is considerable. With respect to the condition that a legal
representative be appointed, however, the two may as well
be discussing entirely different statutes. For scholars, the
absence of any express statutory criteria for such an
appointment requires an assessment of the purpose of the
appointment and leads to additional investigation into
225 Id.
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comparable mechanisms in other areas of law. In court, as
with so many other aspects of Section 524(g), colorable
technical compliance with the statutory language-in this
case, the appointment of someone, anyone, as a nominal
legal representative without more-is generally sufficient,
even where the appointee is burdened by numerous conflicts
of interest.
To be sure, simply continuing the pre-petition legal
representative's role after the commencement of the case has
its advantages. A new legal representative and her
professionals may require weeks or months to get up to
speed, which will be more expensive and, most likely, delay
consideration of important issues in the early stages of the
case. Moreover, the new legal representative may have very
different views on critical elements of the plan, which may
erase the efficiencies obtained by negotiating the deal pre-
petition.
On the other hand, a strong, independent legal
representative will best ensure that any confirmed plan
reflects the best interests of future claimants and provide the
debtor with a greater assurance of finality. Moreover, such
an appointment may ultimately prove more efficient than
the current process because uncertainty should caution the
parties against overreaching during pre-petition
negotiations. If the plan proponents are truly dedicated to a
short stay in Chapter 11, they will not want to propose a
plan that will invite an objection from a reasonable legal
representative. If, on the other hand, a pre-packaged plan is
designed more along the lines of previous asbestos pre-packs,
or the Controlling Firms refuse to work with an independent
legal representative, the bankruptcy court will see, at a very
early stage in the case, that a more aggressive approach in
its dealings with these recalcitrant parties is required.
2. Stripping Away Prospective Conflicts of
Interest
Although legal representatives may be agents without a
principal as a practical matter, they are not agents without
rigid duties. Among these, perhaps the most significant is
the duty of undivided loyalty; if for no other reason, precisely
because their constituency is not able to protect itself from
its agent's misconduct. Even the appearance of conflict may
undermine the integrity of the proceedings, encourage
wasteful litigation, and open the door to future challenges to
the Section 524(g) injunction.
One subtle yet potentially significant conflict arises when
the legal representative is promised lucrative ongoing work
for the bankruptcy trust established under Section 524(g).
As noted previously, this promise provides the legal
representative with strong personal interests both in
ensuring that the plan is approved and in avoiding actions
that might put them at odds with the Controlling Firms that
will serve as trustees over the trusts. Unequivocal rejection
of the appointment of legal representatives to these and
other post-confirmation roles will thus help ensure that their
judgments are not colored by self-interest.
Moreover, courts should be careful to clearly define the
role when appointing a legal representative. Some legal
representatives appear to have no clear picture of who they
represent and operate on the faulty assumption that they
fulfill their obligations solely by maximizing assets that are
paid into the trust. As the rapid depletion of the Manville
and other asbestos trusts vividly demonstrate, this is just
one factor relevant to future victims' ultimate recoveries; no
matter how well-funded a trust may be at the outset,
allowing minimal checks on weak or fraudulent claims will
significantly undermine these future recoveries. And though
weak evidentiary barriers to payment may make it easier for
future claimants to file their own claims, this primarily
benefits the law firms responsible for submitting claims (who
are paid large contingency fees for doing so) and will be of
little comfort if the trust lacks sufficient resources to satisfy
those claims.
V. CONCLUSION
Asbestos pre-packs to date have widely incorporated the
worst aspects of asbestos litigation: pervasive conflicts of
interest, relaxed judicial oversight, wasted resources, and
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under-compensated victims. In stressing the value of
compromise and encouraging asbestos pre-packs, courts have
overlooked the basic elements of these schemes that are
fundamentally inconsistent with compromise-single-
constituency dominance, concealment of critical information,
and exclusion of parties with significant interests at stake.
The superficially reasonable justifications for these failures
do not withstand scrutiny or even a cursory reference to
practical experience. Indeed, this experience shows that,
however noble or understandable the goals, judicial efforts to
facilitate asbestos pre-packs have dramatically undermined
the potential of Section 524(g).
As demonstrated, the most egregious abuses of asbestos
bankruptcy law to date stem less from inherent flaws in the
statutory scheme than the manner in which courts and
participants in the process approach the law. Of course, a
comprehensive global solution to the ills that plague asbestos
litigation may not be possible without congressional action.
But an uncompromising adherence to the dictates of
bankruptcy law generally, and Section 524(g) specifically,
will improve the prospects that viable companies will
survive, victims will be compensated, and the integrity of the
process will be preserved.
